Aware months in advance that the attack would fall on the neck of the Kursk salient, the Soviets built a defence in depth designed to wear down the German armoured spearhead.

[77] Once given freedom of action, Manstein intended to utilise his forces to make a series of counterstrokes into the flanks of the Soviet armoured formations, with the goal of destroying them while retaking Kharkov and Kursk.

[78] A Soviet offensive launched on 25 February by the Central Front against Army Group Centre had to be abandoned by 7 March to allow the attacking formations to disengage and redeploy to the south to counter the threat of the advancing German forces under Manstein.

[91][92] As the last Soviet resistance in Kharkov petered out, Manstein attempted to persuade Günther von Kluge, commander of Army Group Centre, to immediately attack the Central Front, which was defending the northern face of the salient.

[111][109] On 27 April, Model met with Hitler to review and express his concern regarding intelligence which showed the Red Army constructing very strong positions at the shoulders of the salient and having withdrawn their mobile forces from the area west of Kursk.

With pessimism for Citadel increasing with each delay, in June, Alfred Jodl, the Chief of Staff at the OKW, instructed the armed forces propaganda office to portray the upcoming operation as a limited counteroffensive.

The Soviets verified the intelligence via their spy in Britain, John Cairncross, at the Government Code and Cypher School at Bletchley Park, who clandestinely forwarded raw decrypts directly to Moscow.

The separated armoured vehicles – now vulnerable to infantry armed with PTRD-41 anti-tank rifles, demolition charges and molotov cocktails – could then be disabled or destroyed at point-blank range.

[170][171] These included camouflaging gun emplacements, constructing dummy airfields and depots, generating false radio-traffic, and spreading rumours among the Soviet frontline troops and the civilian population in the German-held areas.

The priority was to gain aerial supremacy, then to isolate the battlefield from enemy reinforcements, and finally, once the critical point had been reached in the land battle, to render close air support.

[193] The air groups were also strengthened by the recent arrival of the Henschel Hs 129, with its 30 mm MK 103 cannon, and the F-subtype ground attack ("jabo") version of the Focke-Wulf Fw 190.

Huge stockpiles of supplies and ample reserves of replacement aircraft meant the Red Army and VVS formations would be able to conduct an extended campaign without slackening in the intensity of their effort.

Fighting started on the southern face of the salient on the evening of 4 July 1943, when German infantry launched attacks to seize high ground for artillery observation posts prior to the main assault.

[213][214][212] At around 22:30, Vatutin ordered 600 guns, mortars and Katyusha rocket launchers, of the Voronezh Front, to bombard the forward German positions, particularly those of the II SS Panzer Corps.

[260] The tanks were deployed in a Panzerkeil (arrow) formation to minimise the effects of the Soviet Pakfront defence, with the Tigers leading and the Panzer IIIs, IVs and assault guns fanning out to the flanks and rear.

Despite a poor start, the 7th Panzer Division eventually broke into the first belt of the Soviet defence and pushed on between Razumnoe and Krutoi Log, advancing 10 kilometres (6.2 mi), the furthest Kempf got during the day.

[298][299] The main concern of Manstein and Hausser was the inability of Army Detachment Kempf to advance and protect the eastern flank of the II SS Panzer Corps.

[312] Luftwaffe local air superiority over the battlefield also contributed to the Soviet losses, partly due to the VVS being directed against the German units on the flanks of II SS Panzer Corps.

Manstein's forces had just spent a week fighting through a maze of defensive works and he believed they were on the verge of breaking through to more open terrain, which would allow him to engage and destroy the Soviet armoured reserves in a mobile battle.

Diversionary attacks, launched two weeks earlier across the Donets and Mius Rivers into the Donbas, drew the attention of German reserves and thinned the defending forces that would face the main blow.

[334] The Germans, despite using more technologically advanced armour than in previous years, were unable to break through the deep Soviet defences and were caught off guard by the significant operational reserves of the Red Army.

Stalin stepped back from operational planning, only rarely overruling military decisions, resulting in the Red Army being entrusted with higher levels of autonomy during the war.

Hitler's decisions to delay the offensive were not merely capricious but were based on substantial logistical concerns, notably the preparation of new Panther and Tiger tanks, which he believed were essential for a successful summer campaign.

Recent examinations of wartime documents reveal that Stalin's trust in his generals was underpinned by a well-coordinated defense strategy that had been meticulously planned and robustly fortified by early June 1943.

The Soviet forces, contrary to the implications of passive or reactive strategies, were proactively prepared and strategically positioned, with manpower and artillery strengths reaching over 80 percent of their July capacity by mid-May, effectively nullifying the advantage a swifter German offensive might have achieved.

[341] All told, 239 Red Army personnel were awarded the USSR's highest degree of distinction, the title Hero of the Soviet Union (HSU), for their valour in the Battle of Kursk.

Two women, Guards Senior Sergeants Mariya Borovichenko and Zinaida Mareseva, were awarded the HSU title posthumously for their valour under fire while serving as combat medics.

[356] The German historian Roman Töppel states that official Soviet losses are underestimated by 40%, giving a number of 1.2 million, with him having consulted armies and units archives.

[24] Further, Töppel notes Russian historians critical of the official report estimate losses ranging from 910,000 to 2.3 million men, with Sokolov going as high as 999,300 Soviet casualties at Kursk.

[362] On 17 July 1943 after Hitler had ordered a stop to the German offensive, Guderian sent in the following preliminary assessment of the Panthers, Due to enemy action and mechanical breakdowns, the combat strength sank rapidly during the first few days.