While the Korean People's Army (KPA) achieved some initial successes, their attacks petered out in the face of strong UN defences and as their supply lines became overstretched and by 18 February they had begun to withdraw across the entire front.

His formal order issued late in the day called for the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division, with the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team attached, to defend a long line which from an anchor on the west at Chip’yong-ni stretched out to the southeast and east, passing 2 miles (3.2 km) north of Wonju and continuing 9 miles (14 km) beyond the town.

The ROK 3rd, missing its 18th Regiment and otherwise hurt by casualties, nevertheless managed to put up fair defenses slightly southeast of Wonju and 12 miles (19 km) above Chech’on.

On the 13th, after X Corps had pulled back some 15 miles (24 km), he authorized Yu to withdraw his three divisions into defenses along a general southwest-northeast line between Pyongchang and Gangneung on the coast.

In response to the latest ROK III Corps move, he flashed a reminder to Yu on the 15th that any general withdrawal not forced by enemy pressure violated standing instructions.

[1]: 292 The ostensible aim of the KPA moving on Pyongchang was to drive Yu's forces out of the town and back from Route 60, thereby opening the road for a strike south against Yongwol.

From late afternoon on 15 February through early morning on the 18th, the 9th and 27th Divisions launched repeated company and battalion assaults, seized Pyongchang itself, and, in their best effort, drove down Route 60 within 8 miles (13 km) of Yongwol.

The KPA units, still worn from previous operations, could not sustain their drive against the strong South Korean position, lost most of their gains to ROK counterattacks, and finally withdrew.

With no serious results, a few KPA reached Chuch’onni to the southeast and briefly fired on the ROK 5th Division, which was still assembling straggling forces and feebly attempting to establish defenses centered on the town.

Before the KPA attack diminished in the evening, the division had fallen back five miles and, in the judgment of the KMAG advisors, was no longer to be counted as an effective force.

Yu, his leftmost forces well occupied and anyway obliged by Ridgway's orders of the 16th to stand fast in the Pyongchang area, could do nothing about filling the gap; neither could any of the weak ROK divisions in the X Corps sector.

Ridgway on 17 February consequently directed Almond to push American troops northeast to clear out the KPA and establish firm contact with the ROK III Corps.

Although Almond, expecting a strong Chinese strike south of the Hoengsong, had emphasized the defense of Wonju, enemy forces made no concerted effort to seize the town after failing to do so on the 14th.

The KPA may have backed off only to reorganize for new attacks; but in light of what had taken place in the meantime along the X Corps’ west shoulder, their move was more likely part of a general withdrawal.

[1]: 294–5 Following the defeat of the PVA at Chipyong-ni and the PVA/KPA on the Wonju line, it became apparent that the PVA/KPA forces were retiring from the salient they had created in the central region in the Chinese Fourth Phase Offensive.