During Stage 1's powered flight, the oxidizer tank began leaking N2O4 which was thought to have resulted in the loss of lubrication to the Engine 1 turbopump and breakdown of the pinion gear.

The Titan III's flawless West Coast launch record meant that the Air Force felt confident enough to remove several telemetry measurements from the boosters in the interest of reduced weight and complexity.

These included reinstalling some of the deleted telemetry probes on the Titan as well as improved camera coverage; the next launch would even have the aircraft flying overhead to provide additional photography.

[2][3] The investigation indicated the right solid rocket motor rupturing starting at T+6 seconds with the resulting torque on the launch vehicle caused the left SRM to break away.

Debris rained onto SLC-4E, badly damaging the launch complex in the process and starting numerous small fires, some of which burned for up to two days.

Extracting launch personnel from the blockhouse proved difficult due to the area around the pad being filled with toxic fumes and burning debris.

The disaster drew comparisons to the Challenger shuttle accident three months earlier, which was also the victim of a solid rocket motor malfunction.

Due to the classified payload, extensive efforts were made to clean up all remains of the KH-9, whose film reels were ripped apart into hundreds of small pieces and scattered around the pad area.

However, the Challenger disaster created a renewed emphasis on ELVs and would see a considerable expansion of the upcoming Titan IV program, which was originally intended for just ten launches.

While all the rocket segments were at least five years old (since all flight article Titan 34Ds had been manufactured and delivered by 1982 and the production line long since shut down), there had been no similar problems on other SRMs of the same age.