Battery and assault require the claimant to establish that the defendant intended to act, while false imprisonment is a tort of strict liability.
The guiding principle behind all three is based on the statement of Robert Goff, LJ, who stated in Collins v Wilcock that "any person's body is inviolate",[4] excepting normal, day-to-day physical contact.
The general principle is that a trespass to the person must be a direct and intentional act, while if it was indirect or unintentional the tort of negligence would be more appropriate, as established in Letang v Cooper.
[9] In English law, an assault means to act in such a way that the claimant or victim apprehends the application of immediate unlawful force upon themselves.
In R v Costanza, the courts held that threats made by a stalker could be assault, while in R v Ireland,[10] the House of Lords said that in the right situation (specifically, harassing phone calls) silence could be enough.
In Collins v Wilcock,[13] a female police officer took hold of a woman's arm, intending to talk to her on suspicion of soliciting contrary to the Street Offences Act 1959.
In Livingstone v Ministry of Defence,[15] the defendant, a soldier, had intended to shoot someone with a baton round, which went wide and hit the claimant.
This was undermined by R v F, in which Robert Goff wrote that he "respectfully doubts whether [the requirement to show hostility] is correct", in line with his comment in Collins.
Unlike assault and battery, false imprisonment is a tort of strict liability: no intention on the behalf of the defendant is needed, but the imprisonment must be caused by a deliberate act (as decided in Sayers v Harlow Urban District Council, where a faulty lock, not a deliberate act from another party, caused a woman to become trapped in a public toilet)[22] and must be unlawful.
In Austin and another v Metropolitan Police Commissioner,[23] seven hours was considered a sufficient period of time to constitute false imprisonment (although the claim was ultimately rejected due to the circumstances of a potentially hostile crowd of demonstrators).
[24] The requirement is complete restraint; in Bird v Jones,[25] the defendant fenced off part of a footpath for use as a viewing point for a boat race.
There is on the other hand no requirement that the claimant actually attempt to leave, as in Grainger v Hill,[26] or even that he knows he is being prevented from leaving, as in Meering v Graham-White Aviation Co Ltd.[27][28] There are many defences to trespasses against the person; the stranger are the right of parents to commit assault and battery against their children for "chastisement" under the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, and the right of the captain of a ship to discipline his crew, as in Hook v Cunard Steamship Co Ltd.[29] There is also a right to eject a trespasser to land using reasonable force, and a defendant is also not liable for "inevitable accidents", as in Stanley v Powell, where a ricocheting pellet was ruled to be accidental.
[30][31] Individuals and bodies will not be liable for imprisonment, battery or assault if doing so in line with statutory authorities, such as the Criminal Law Act 1967.
This is not the case if the physical contact went beyond what could be expected, as in R v Billinghurst,[33] or where the injuries were suffered not from the claimant's participation in the sport but inadequate safety measures taken, as in Watson v British Boxing Board of Control.
[34] The same general rule applies to people who voluntarily take part in fights, although only if the injuries caused are proportionate, as in Lane v Holloway.
[41] If the action is undertaken to prevent a crime, Section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967 permits it assuming that it is "reasonable under the circumstances".
Goods cover almost any physical object, including animals, as in Slater v Swann,[45] but not organs, as in AB & Ors v Leeds Teaching Hospital NHS Trust.
Accidental trespass also incurs liability, with an exception for entering land adjoining a road unintentionally (such as in a car accident), as in River Wear Commissioners v Adamson.
[53] Although previously a pure tort, the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 created some circumstances in which trespass to land can also be a crime.
[55] An overhanging crane can constitute trespass, as in Woolerton v Costain,[56] as can an advertising sign, as in Kelsen v Imperial Tobacco Co.[57] Possession does not necessarily mean the ownership of land, but the right to eject or exclude others from it.