Later in the day, Eighth Army issued radio orders making IX Corps, under General John B. Coulter, operational at 14:00, 23 September and attaching the US 2nd and 25th Infantry Divisions to it.
[2]: 575 16 miles (26 km) downstream from Chinju, near the blown bridges leading to Uiryong, engineer troops and more than 1,000 Korean refugees worked all day on the 25th constructing a sandbag ford across the Nam River.
Once on the north bank, elements of the regiment attacked toward Uiryong, 3 miles (4.8 km) to the northwest, and secured the town just before noon after overcoming a KPA force that defended it with small arms and mortar fire.
[2]: 575 On 24 September Eighth Army had altered its earlier operational order and directed IX Corps to execute unlimited objective attacks to seize Chonju and Kanggyong.
Task Force Matthews, the lefthand column, was to proceed west toward Hadong and there turn northwest to Kurye, Namwon, Sunch'ang, Kumje, Iri and Kunsan on the Kum River estuary.
Taking off at the same time, Task Force Dolvin, the righthand column, was to drive north out of Chinju toward Hamyang, there turn west to Namwon, and proceed northwest to Chonju, Iri and Kanggyong on the Kum River.
Apparently the North Koreans' attention had been centered on two F-84 jets that could be seen sweeping in wide circles, rocketing and strafing the town, and they were unaware that pursuing ground elements were so close.
After the task force dispersed the KPA soldiers and cleared the road of mines, it found six antitank guns, nine vehicles, and an estimated seven truckloads of ammunition in the vicinity abandoned by the enemy.
This apparently was true, for in its advance from Hyopch'on to Koch'ang the 38th Infantry captured 17 trucks, 10 motorcycles, 14 antitank guns, four artillery pieces, nine mortars, more than 300 tons of ammunition, and 450 KPA soldiers, and killed an estimated 260 more.
[2]: 581 IX Corps had only two and a half truck companies with which to transport supplies to the 25th and 2nd Divisions in their long penetrations, and the distance of front-line units from the railhead increased hourly.
Major Kenneth Muir, second in command of the Argylls, watching the flames on the crest die down, noticed that a few wounded men still held a small area on top.
Smaller actions flared simultaneously at several points on the road back to Waegwan as bypassed KPA units struck at elements of the 19th Infantry bringing up the rear of the 24th Division advance.
At Taejon the division captured much KPA equipment, including four U.S. howitzers lost earlier and 50 new North Korean heavy machine guns still packed in grease.
On the morning of 21 September, Colonel Lee Hak Ku, the chief of staff of the KPA 13th Division surrendered to the 8th Cavalry Regiment near the village of Samsandong 4 miles (6.4 km) south of Tabu-dong.
There, before he turned back to the division command post in Taegu, Gay approved Lynch's decision to stop pending confirmation of the order not to cross the river there but to proceed to Naktong-ni.
At 18:00 Lynch received confirmation and repetition of the order, and an hour later he led his task force onto the road, heading north for Naktong-ni, 10 miles (16 km) away.
5 miles (8.0 km) up the river road it began to pass through burning villages, and then suddenly it came upon the rear elements of retreating North Koreans who surrendered without resistance.
Task Force Lynch captured a large amount of equipment at the Naktong-ni crossing site, including two abandoned and operable T-34 tanks; 50 trucks, some of them still carrying US division markings; and approximately ten artillery pieces.
He was able, however, to send a message to Eighth Army headquarters by liaison plane asking for clarification of what he thought was a confusion of Walker's orders, and requesting authority to continue the breakthrough and join X Corps in the vicinity of Suwon.
Acting quickly on this authority, Gay called a commanders' conference in a Sangju schoolhouse the next morning, 26 September, and issued oral orders that at twelve noon the division would start moving day and night until it joined the X Corps near Suwon.
At mid-afternoon, Walker and Fifth Air Force commander General Earle E. Partridge, flying from Taegu unannounced, landed at Suwon Airfield and conferred with members of the 31st Infantry staff for about an hour.
Webel had followed this tank and at one point was just on the verge of climbing on it to drop a grenade down its periscope hole when it jerked loose from a vehicle it had crashed into and almost caught him under its tracks.
On the night of 1–2 October, shortly after midnight, an organized KPA force of from 1,000 to 2,000 soldiers, which had been bypassed some place in the mountains, struck with savage fury as it broke out in its attempt to escape northward.
The impressive gains by the ROK units prompted General Walker to remark on 25 September, "Too little has been said in praise of the South Korean Army which has performed so magnificently in helping turn this war from the defensive to the offensive."
A USAF T-6 Mosquito Forward Air Controller pilot dropped a note to 200 KPA soldiers northeast of Kunsan ordering them to lay down their arms and assemble on a nearby hill.
The virtual collapse of the North Korean military caused MacArthur on 1 October to order the USAF to cease further destruction of rail, highway, bridge, and other communication facilities south of the 38th Parallel, except where they were known to be actively supporting a KPA force.
A few miles north of Andong advancing ROK forces found approximately ten 76-mm guns, eight 120-mm mortars, five trucks and four jeeps, together with dead KPA soldiers, in a tunnel—all had been destroyed earlier by USAF napalm attacks at either end of the tunnel.
One of the largest groups, estimated to number about 3,000 and including soldiers from the KPA 6th and 7th Divisions with about 500 civil officials, took refuge initially in the Chiri Mountains of southwest Korea.
Just before midnight, 1 October, a force of approximately sixty KPA riflemen, using antitank and dummy mines, established and maintained a roadblock for nearly ten hours across the main Seoul highway about 15 miles (24 km) northwest of Kumch'on.
The commanding general of KPA I Corps apparently dissolved his headquarters at Choch'iwon during the retreat and then fled with some staff officers northeast into the Taebaek Mountains on or about 27 September.