Cavalry in the American Civil War

The Battle of Brandy Station in 1863 is considered the point by which Union cavalry proved itself equal to the Confederates, and onward through the second half of the war they continued to improve.

This was exemplified by Benjamin Grierson's brilliant deception tactics in the Mississippi valley, and Philip Sheridan's aggressive movements while in command of the Army of the Shenandoah at the end of the war in Virginia.

Cavalry units proved highly expensive to maintain, and unscrupulous agents would often exploit shortages by supplying defective animals at exorbitant prices.

The Union benefited from the creation of tighter regulations and a centralized acquisition and distribution system which ensured its forces remained mounted throughout the war.

Their inherent nature made cavalry ideally suited to be the "eyes and ears" of an army's commander and keep him informed of the enemy's position and movements.

[9][10] Cavalry had the agility and firepower to probe the enemy for weak points, set ambushes for isolated groups, and flee before the main force could overwhelm them.

Stuart effectively employed counter-reconnaissance to screen passes in the Blue Ridge Mountains and hide Robert E. Lee's movements from the Army of the Potomac.

However, when Stuart was "cut loose" to conduct another raid around the Army of the Potomac, he deprived Lee of adequate reconnaissance at the beginning of the Battle of Gettysburg, one of the principal reasons for the Confederate defeat there.

However, during the Civil War, the rifled musket was the primary infantry firearm, and against a weapon with an effective range of up to 500 yards (460 m) these mounted shock tactics were rendered ineffective and disastrous on the battlefield.

[14] Paddy Griffith observed that the United States never had a strong tradition of heavy cavalry which normally conducted such attacks, whereas a cost-conscious Congress preferred to fund dragoons and mounted infantry which had more supposed versatility.

While there was a shift towards more dragoon-based tactics overall, he cites a number of other factors for this evolution, principal among them being the quality of the mounts available and the lack of appropriate training for both horse and rider.

George Stoneman's raid in the Battle of Chancellorsville was considered a failure for although it destroyed considerable Confederate property, much of this was quickly repaired, at the cost of at least 1,000 of his horses ruined by the exertion.

Meanwhile Benjamin Grierson's raid in the Vicksburg Campaign was a strategic masterpiece that diverted critical Confederate forces away from Ulysses S. Grant's army.

[1][22] Additionally, at least one cavalry legion was formed early in the war by combining infantry and artillery forces into one large regiment, but the concept was soon abandoned for being too unwieldy.

Both cavalries originally required recruits or local communities to provide horses, a policy that lasted briefly in the North, while the South maintained it throughout the war even though Richmond leaders recognized its serious drawbacks.

[29][30] Union army guidelines for cavalry horse selection mandated animals be at least 15 hands (60 inches (150 cm)) high, weighing on average around 950 pounds (430 kg), and aged between 4 and 10 years old, and be well-broken to bridle and saddle.

Geldings were preferred for cavalry horses with the purchase of mares strictly prohibited outside absolute military emergency, while stallions' volatility and aggressiveness made them generally unsuitable for service.

[33] On both sides volunteer officers often proved notably lax in promoting strict animal welfare, a shortcoming exacerbated by the absence of a trained and organized veterinary corps which allowed serious maladies like strangles, grease heel, and glanders to spread among army stock.

[19] Stuart, during the Gettysburg Campaign, resorted to procuring replacement horses from local farmers and townspeople during his grueling trek northward around the Union army.

Confederate soldiers meanwhile might carry anything from the latest carbines imported from Europe to flintlock muskets and Bowie knives, although the primary source for their weapons was whatever could be captured from defeated Union forces.

The common explanations for this stereotype were the poor road conditions in the rural South, requiring a greater reliance on horses for individual transportation, combined with a pervasive cavalier culture within the Southern aristocracy which emphasized equestrianism.

[46][47] Historian Gregory J. W. Urwin has referred to such a broad generalization as a part of a "tired, overly-familiar myth" which explains away the South's defeat due to the North's industrial might.

[48] Paddy Griffith also argues that, with each trooper having to supply their own horse, "[o]ne does not need to invoke any theory of 'Southern Cavaliers' or 'innate equestrian skills' to see that a soldier will do better if he rides his own cherished four-legged friend than if he is astride an anonymous item of government property.

In the Eastern Theater, the Partisan Ranger John Singleton Mosby succeeded in tying down upwards of 40,000 Federal troops defending rail lines and logistical hubs with only 100 to 150 irregulars.

The Union was initially reluctant to enlist additional regiments, because of the expense, the understanding that training an effective cavalryman could take as long as two years, and the conventional wisdom that the rough and forested terrain of the United States, being so different from that of Western Europe, would make the deployment of Napoleonic-style cavalry forces ineffective.

While initially reluctant to form a large cavalry force, the Union eventually fielded some 258 mounted regiments and 170 unattached companies, of differing enlistment periods, throughout the war and suffered 10,596 killed and 26,490 wounded during the struggle.

With West Point's graduating class of 1861 unable to make up the deficiency, many officer positions were filled by green appointees from the civilian sector.

[19] Early in the war, the Army of the Potomac did not organize its cavalry regiments into larger formations to perform independent operations, but instead paired them with infantry divisions.

Widely regarded as inferior to its Southern counterpart up until then, the Battle of Brandy Station, although tactically indecisive, is recognized as the point at which it was acknowledged to have comparable competence.

Despite the reluctance of his superior, Major General George G. Meade, Sheridan convinced General-in-Chief Ulysses S. Grant to allow him to deploy the cavalry in long-range raids, the first of which, at Yellow Tavern, resulted in the death of Confederate commander Jeb Stuart.