"[4][5] On the morning of February 10, 1976, Sylvia Mendenhall was walking through the concourse of Detroit Metropolitan Airport after disembarking a commercial flight returning from Los Angeles.

Mendenhall was convicted and a court of appeals reversed the decision, stating that she did not properly consent to the search.

According to Justice Stewart, evidence that Mendenhall was not asked to accompany agents to the DEA office was insufficient grounds upon which to deny that she had given consent.

[2] The Fourth Amendment serves "to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals" (United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554).

The man named in the title of the case, John W. Terry, was unable to walk away and was forced to submit to a search.

"[10] In United States v. Mendenhall, the court determined that "seizure" occurs when an officer uses physical force or displays authority to detain a person.

In United States v. Drayton, the court determined that the Fourth Amendment does not govern consensual encounters.

Because neither of the courts below considered the question, I do not reach the Government's contention that the agents did not "seize" the respondent within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

Mr. Justice Stewart concludes that the DEA agents acted lawfully, regardless of whether there were any reasonable grounds for suspecting Ms. Mendenhall of criminal activity, because he finds that Ms. Mendenhall was not "seized" by the DEA agents, even though, throughout the proceedings below, the Government never questioned the fact that a seizure had occurred necessitating a [display] of antecedent reasonable suspicion.

Mr. Justice Powell's opinion concludes that, even though Ms. Mendenhall may have been "seized," the seizure was lawful, because her behavior while changing planes in the airport provided reasonable suspicion that she was engaging in criminal activity.

The Court then concludes, based on the absence of evidence that Ms. Mendenhall resisted her detention, that she voluntarily consented to being taken to the DEA office, even though she, in fact, had no choice in the matter.

This conclusion is inconsistent with our recognition that consent cannot be presumed from a showing of acquiescence to authority, and it cannot be reconciled with our decision last Term in Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979).

Mr. Justice Powell strongly believes that Ms. Mendenhall was forced into the search, even though there is a lack of evidence that she did not have the opportunity to leave.