On August 17, 1972, an informant, identified as Awad "Tony" Khoury, telephoned a postal inspector named Frank L. Barbarick to inform him that one Henry Ogle Watson was in possession of a stolen Bank of America credit card that belonged to a Syed T. Ahmed.

Having confirmed that Watson did have additional cards, the informant signaled the inspectors, and they removed him from the restaurant and arrested him.

[1] Watson filed a pre-trial motion to suppress against the evidence that was found in his car, claiming that there was a lack of probable cause and that him saying,"Go ahead."

His conviction was reversed by the Federal Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, arguing that," Appellant next contends that (A) the hearing on the motion to suppress failed to establish that the informant's reliability was sufficient to warrant use of his 'tip'; (B) he contends that the failure to obtain an arrest warrant vitiates the arrest and subsequent seizure; and (C) he contends that a consent to search cannot be acquired during an illegal detention and that his consent was not shown to be voluntary and knowledgeable.

There appears to be no reason for the failure to present the question to a detached magistrate to obtain an arrest warrant.

Appellant had been placed under arrest and was in custody at the time that he gave the officers permission to search his car.

In looking at the factual issue of voluntariness, the court must be aware of the 'vulnerable subjective state' of the defendant as well as the possibility of 'subtly coercive police questions.'

To the extent that the issue of the voluntariness of Watson's consent was resolved on the premise that his arrest was illegal, the Court of Appeals was also in error.

We are satisfied in addition that the remaining factors relied upon by the Court of Appeals to invalidate Watson's consent are inadequate to demonstrate that, in the totality of the circumstances, Watson's consent was not his own "essentially free and unconstrained choice" because his "will ha[d] been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired."

Similarly, under Schneckloth, the absence of proof that Watson knew he could withhold his consent, though it may be a factor in the overall judgment, is not to be given controlling significance.

There is no indication in this record that Watson was a newcomer [p425] to the law, [n14] mentally deficient, or unable in the face of a custodial arrest to exercise a free choice.

In these circumstances, to hold that illegal coercion is made out from the fact of arrest and the failure to inform the arrestee that he could withhold consent would not be consistent with Schneckloth and would distort the voluntariness standard that we reaffirmed in that case."

Justice Lewis Powell concurred with the majority opinion, arguing that this case was the definitive holding on the constitutionality of a warrantless arrest in a public place.

He wrote," "Moreover, a constitutional rule permitting felony arrests only with a warrant or in exigent circumstances could severely hamper effective law enforcement.

Good police practice often requires postponing an arrest, even after probable cause has been established, in order to place the suspect under surveillance or otherwise develop further evidence necessary to prove guilt to a jury.

[n4] Under the holding of the Court of Appeals, such additional investigative work could imperil the entire prosecution.

Potter Stewart concurred, arguing that the Supreme Court should not measure what circumstances the officer must pass before getting an arrest warrant, if the crime takes place in public and in broad daylight,"The arrest in this case was made upon probable cause in a public place in broad daylight.

Thurgood Marshall dissented, with Brennan joining, claiming that this decision gave broad powers to police to arrest suspects in public without a warrant.

"By granting police broad powers to make warrantless arrests, the Court today sharply reverses the course of our modern decisions construing the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment.

The Court takes both steps with a remarkable lack of consideration of either the facts of this case or the constitutional questions it is deciding.

"Since, for reasons it leaves unexpressed, the Court does not take this traditional course, I am constrained to express my views on the issues it unnecessarily decides.

The Court reaches its conclusion that a warrant is not necessary for a police officer to make an arrest in a public place, so long as he has probable cause to believe a felony has been committed, on the basis of its views of precedent and history.