Initially conceived by Dr Paul Wild of the CSIRO in 1984, the proposal was adopted by a private-sector joint venture in 1987, comprising Elders IXL, Kumagai Gumi, TNT and BHP.

Although this would require a top speed of 350 km/h, substantially faster than the 270 km/h TGV (the world's then-fastest commercial service), high-speed rail technology was progressing at such a pace to make this a plausible near-term objective.

Dr Wild's preliminary analysis indicated that the most favourable route would be via Cooma, Orbost and the Gippsland region; he bought a set of "about two dozen" 1:100,000 survey maps, tracing out the 7-km radius curves that such speeds would necessitate with 14 cm-diameter dinner plates on his living room floor.

Although Prime Minister Bob Hawke observed that a fast railway would be very valuable to the Labor government's policy of decentralisation, the bureaucracy was sceptical of the cost assumptions given in the CSIRO's report, particularly earthworks, which they estimated to cost $2.8 billion against the CSIRO's estimate of $800 million (this was due to an assumption, not shared by the government analysis, that high speed trains could withstand short sections of steeper grade than conventional trains).

About a week after the Hawke Government's decisive rejection of the fast railway proposal, Dr Wild received a phone call from the head of transport giant TNT, Sir Peter Abeles, who began: "I think I can help you with a commercial solution to your problem.

He believed that the establishment of a fast railway would additionally facilitate regional development outside the major cities, particularly the south-east of the continent which was then – and remains – poorly served by transportation links.

An office was set up in Canberra, and the first meeting of the Very Fast Train Joint Venture took place on 2 June 1986, with two delegates from each of the members, plus Dr Wild as chairman.

Events moved quickly; with the help of a team of international consultants (most of whom provided their services below cost), the pre-feasibility study was completed in June 1987, and showed that the VFT would be both technically and financially viable.

In August, the joint venture received a substantial boost with BHP joining as a fourth partner, bringing their experience with the construction of heavy industrial rail.

In August 1989, the Government issued a statement of support to the VFT project, against the advice of eight Federal departments which had advised against taking a definite position due to uncertainties remaining after the release of the joint venture's concept report, which they declared "inadequate."

[citation needed] In January 1990 it was reported that the NSW Government was considering upgrading the existing state railway lines to use tilting train technology under development by UK engineering giant ASEA Brown Boveri.

[9] The VFT joint venture considered the potential of tilting trains in its own study but dismissed them, suggesting that the achievable speed increases are often overstated.

Without major works to ease curve radii and increase cant on the existing rail alignment, the joint venture concluded that tilting trains could offer, at best, an 8-hour service between Sydney and Melbourne, which they deemed would not be competitive with air travel.

From Glenfield through to a point 15 kilometres north of Mittagong, it would cross the Hume Highway several times before following it to south of Goulburn from where it would pass to the west of Lake George.

A brief analysis of a link to Brisbane, initially proposed in a 1989 paper prepared at the request of the Queensland Government[citation needed] and designated "VFT-N," was included in the 1990 Project Evaluation.

Although substantive studies were never undertaken, the joint venture also considered a link from Melbourne to Adelaide ("VFT-S"), branching from the mainline at Seymour and taking an estimated 2 hours 20 minutes.

With the shorter travel time, the potential market was estimated at two-thirds that of Sydney-Melbourne,[11] despite Adelaide's lower population; the consortium reported the VFT-S was both "possible and viable".

[10][12] In May 1990, an interim report tabled in the senate[11] raised doubts about the VFT's construction and operating costs, fare schedule, passenger demand and environmental impact.

[14] According to economist Peter Swan of the University of New South Wales, the Progress Report seemed to indicate that the project's financial viability hinged on a massive land-development program in the vicinity of new stations along the route, in turn made possible by large-scale governmental compulsory-acquisition orders and development approvals.

[16] One of the main concerns centred around the noise levels expected from the new trains, which environmentalists said would be "equivalent to a continuous stream of jets taking off", and would be heard five kilometres away.

[18] In the early years of the proposal, a coastal corridor was favoured which would have necessitated a new rail alignment through the relatively pristine eucalyptus forests of East Gippsland.

Aside from the direct impact of clearing, earthworks and construction for the new line, concerns were raised by environmentalists about the potential for the VFT to disrupt natural fauna migration corridors.

In August 1990, it was reported that the joint venture was seeking tax concessions from the government, on the grounds that other privately owned transport providers (e.g., airlines and buses) are not expected to pay directly for necessary infrastructure such as airports and freeways.

[27][28][29] Peter Abeles, whose initial interest in the VFT had been critical to forming the joint venture, was particularly aggrieved; he was driven by a desire to develop the remote Australian south-east, and made no secret of his distaste for the new strategy, reportedly telling the consortium "You've lost the plot".

In May 1991, chief executive Alan Castleman told reporters he expected additional changes to the membership of the consortium; talks were being held with "three banks and three industrial companies" who were interested in joining, should the question of tax concessions be settled favourably.

[30] In August 1991, after a lengthy period of consideration, Federal Cabinet rejected the taxation arrangements proposed by the joint venture, citing the "revenue costs and resource allocation implications of allowing wider access to tax losses for all taxpayers.

[33] Reaction to the breakup of the Very Fast Train Joint Venture was mixed, with some condemning the government for "lack of vision", and others hailing it as the economically sound decision.

It estimated the 1748 km railway between Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane with a spur line to Canberra would cost $114 billion (100% publicly funded) and not be fully operational until 2065.

It was heavily criticised for its extremely high cost estimates and absurdly long construction timeframe, with the suggestion that this meant the government had never intended the project to go ahead.

[43] The Very Fast Train Joint Venture's series of studies remain the most expensive investigation of high speed rail performed in Australia with a cost of over $37 million in 2013 dollars, and no proposal has come closer to becoming a reality.