[4] Unaccountably Morley in 1882 claimed that only one of these pits reached the Hutton coal, and that the other stopped short at the Shield Row.

[3] By 1909 only the Busty level was serviced directly: coal was lowered down a staple[c] from the Towneley and down a drift from the Tilley.

The official enquiry conducted at the time states that "the presence of gas had been reported frequently during the four or five months before the explosion".

A large stone measuring "from 4 to 5 yards long, 2 feet broad, and from 10 inches to a foot in thickness" (approximately 4m x 0.6m x 28 cm) had fallen from the roof.

The report concluded that this fall released a large quantity of firedamp which had been under pressure within the cavity.

The inspector was unable to decide which of two things then happened: either that the outrush of gas was sufficient to blow the flame through the gauze of one of their safety lamps, or that as the men started to move away from the fall, they snatched up their lamps causing a sufficient air current to pass the flame.

[10] There had been indications of a large quantity of gas in the area; not only had it already been detected but hissing and bubbling sounds had been heard before the explosion.

The owner had tried to introduce Mueseler lamps (which withstand a greater current of air) but the men had resisted them since they gave a poorer light.

No certified copy of the rules could be found, one of the deputies was illiterate so could not have read and enforced the rules, reports were not made in the correct books, licenses for men who were permitted to carry lamp keys and fire shots were not issued, the barometer and thermometer records were not correctly kept.

[13] However, in his final remarks Morley accepted that on this occasion, the management deficiencies did not contribute to the disaster.

As a result of the increased volume, the lamp was unsafe; an explosion inside would be large enough to pass through the gauze and ignite the surrounding atmosphere.

The coroner allowed Atkinson to read the statement, but directed the jury to disregard it in their determination of the identity and cause of death.

[22] Shot firing to bring down stone and, in some seams, coal appears to have been tightly controlled.

Five minutes later there was a "burring" noise from the generators indicating an electrical overload, followed by two of the three (one per phase) fuses blowing.

A few moments later the cloud was sucked back down the downcast shaft as air circulation re-established.

The downcast (Busty) shaft suffered damage all the way to the surface, and then the casing between the pit top and the heapstead[d] was blown down.

The upcast (lamp) pit also suffered damage, but fortunately the fan was uninjured and continued to run.

Further damage to the props and the separation door indicated that the explosion had swept into the seam ("inbye") before sweeping out ("outbye").

The onsetter, Matthew Elliott, was the only man to have survived from the Busty seam, and his evidence is quoted at length.

Four possibilities were considered: Open lights (lamps or matches), shot firing, sparking from friction, and electricity.

No evidence of faulty lights or contraband was found (though there remains the question of the Howart's Patent Deflector reported at the 1933 inquiry).

[30] The report concluded with a number of recommendations, including better mechanical protection of electrical equipment (impact and ingress of gas or dust), trip coils in place of fuses, and better cleaning.

[31] The Tanfield "pitman poet" Tommy Armstrong wrote a lyric, "In Memory of 168 Men and Boys who lost their Lives by the West Stanley Explosion, February 16, 1909".

It recommends that the lyric be sung to the popular music hall melody "Castles in the Air", a favourite of Armstrong’s.