X Article

[note 1] Though the speech was in line with previous statements by Stalin, it provoked fear in the American press and public; Time magazine called it "the most warlike pronouncement uttered by any top-rank statesman since V-J Day".

It argued that the Soviet leaders used the ideology to characterize the external world as hostile, allowing them to justify their continued hold on power despite a lack of popular support.

Kennan revised a piece he had submitted to Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal in late January 1947, but his role in government precluded him from publishing under his name.

[4] Stalin's speech provoked fear in the American press and public,[7] with Time magazine calling it "the most warlike pronouncement uttered by any top-rank statesman since V-J Day.

"[5] George F. Kennan, then working for the US State Department as chargé d'affaires in Moscow,[3] found the speech routine and reflective of previous statements from Stalin.

[4] Despite the familiar statements from Stalin, the context in which they were made – including the Soviet Union's recent rejection of Bretton Woods and evidence of atomic espionage in the United States and Canada – alarmed officials in Washington.

The message described the press and public's reaction having been, "to a degree not hitherto felt",[12] and expressed: "We should welcome receiving from you an interpretive analysis of what we may expect in the way of future implementation of these announced policies.

[3] The Soviet leaders reached these illogical sentiments, he explained,[21] because "... at the bottom of the Kremlin's view of world affairs is a traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity.

"[10] The authority of previous Russian rulers was "archaic in form, fragile and artificial in its psychological foundation, unable to stand comparison or contact with political systems of western countries".

[21] Their obstinacy in dealing with the West was born out of necessity;[22] seeing the rest of the world as hostile provided an excuse "for the dictatorship without which they did not know how to rule, for cruelties they did not dare not to inflict, for sacrifices they felt bound to demand".

[11] Managing the threat would require "the same thoroughness and care as solution of major strategic problem in war, and if necessary, with no smaller outlay in planning effort".

[14] It gained a larger readership than was typical for a classified document, with readers including ambassador to Cuba Henry Norweb, British diplomat Frank Roberts, General George C. Marshall and President Truman.

[26] Policymakers, military officials and intelligence analysts generally came to understand that the Soviet Union's primary foreign policy goal was world domination under a Communist state.

"[32] Gaddis and historian Wilson D. Miscamble both believe that Halle overstates Kennan's impact on State Department thinking, emphasizing that the Department was already moving towards a more adversarial position against the Soviets,[33] though Miscamble concedes, "there can be no doubt that Kennan's cable exercised a catalytic effect upon departmental thinking especially as regards the possibility of the United States achieving any non-adversary relationship with the Soviet Union.

"[34] If none of my previous literary efforts had seemed to evoke even the faintest tinkle from the bell at which they were aimed, this one, to my astonishment, struck it squarely and set it vibrating with a resonance that was not to die down for many months.

[36][note 3] Historian Melvyn P. Leffler points out that before the long telegram had circulated widely, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had already resolved in February 1946 that "collaboration with the Soviet Union should stop short not only of compromise of principle but also of expansion of Russian influence in Europe and in the Far East.

[19] Representative of Stalin's opinions,[19] Novikov's telegram argued in part: "The foreign policy of the United States reflects the imperialistic tendencies of American monopolistic capitalism, [and] is characterized ... by a striving for world supremacy.

[45] International banker R. Gordon Wasson attended the discussion and was impressed by Kennan, suggesting that the Council revise the talk for publication in their journal Foreign Affairs.

In January 1946, Forrestal had asked Kennan for an analysis of a piece by Smith College professor Edward F. Willett entitled "Dialectical Materialism And Russian Objectives".

[48][note 4] In a letter of March 10 to John T. Connor, an aide of Forrestal, Kennan inquired as to whether it would be appropriate to publish this piece anonymously in Foreign Affairs.

[52] ... it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.

[48] At times quoting Edward Gibbon's The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire,[55] he writes that the Soviet leaders' "aggressive intransigence" against the outside world compelled them "to chastise the contumacy" which they had provoked.

[58] This "perimeter defense" concept, in which all geographic areas were considered of equal importance,[60] required the United States "to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world.

"[62] Containment was particularly suited for use against the Soviets, Kennan thought, because of their Marxist-Leninist ideology, which encourages a patience not evident with leaders like Napoleon or Adolf Hitler.

"[50] The long delay between its writing and publication – some five months – meant the piece did not discuss either of the recent communist uprisings in Greece and Turkey, nor did it mention the Truman Doctrine.

[74] Kennan's explanation that the article had been "cleared for publication by the competent official committee" satisfied Marshall, "[b]ut it was long, I suspect, before he recovered from his astonishment over the strange ways of the department he now headed.

"[76] Political commentator Walter Lippmann responded to the article,[72] published in the New York Herald Tribune across fourteen different columns, the first which appeared on September 2, 1947.

[77][note 6] Lippmann critiqued the article as having presented a "strategic monstrosity", providing the Soviets with the initiative in any conflict, resulting in the United States depending on "a coalition of disorganized, disunited, feeble or disorderly nations, tribes and factions.

"[6] Gaddis writes that Kennan's silence in the face of Lippmann's critiques resulted in the idea of containment becoming "synonymous, in the minds of most people who knew the phrase, with Truman's doctrine".

[85] Thomas Borstelmann writes that Kennan's few experiences outside of Europe contributed to his detestation of the people of Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America: "He tended to lump them together as impulsive, fanatical, ignorant, lazy, unhappy, and prone to mental disorders and other biological deficiencies.