Academic skepticism

The school was characterized by its attacks on the Stoics, particularly their dogma that convincing impressions led to true knowledge.

His followers, the Pyrrhonists, pointed out the problem of the criterion: that our theories and our sense impressions are unable to accurately distinguish truth from falsehood; therefore we must suspend judgment (epoche).

Following the death of the Pyrrhonist Timon of Phlius, the Platonic Academy became the primary advocate of skepticism until the mid-first century BCE.

[1] They acknowledged some vestiges of a moral law within, at best merely a plausible guide, the possession of which, however, formed the real distinction between the sage and the fool.

The uncertainty of sense data applies equally to the conclusions of reason, and therefore man must be content with probability which is sufficient as a practical guide.

There is no notion that may not deceive us; it is impossible to distinguish between false and true impressions; therefore the Stoic phantasia kataleptike must be given up.

[15] In Philo of Larissa, we find a tendency not only to reconcile the internal divergences of the Academy itself, but also to connect it with parallel systems of thought.

[11] In general, his philosophy was a reaction against the skeptic or agnostic position of the middle and new Academy in favor of the dogmatism of Plato.

[16] Philo of Larissa endeavored to show that Carneades was not opposed to Plato, and further that the apparent antagonism between Platonism and Stoicism was because they were arguing from different points of view.

From this syncretism emerged the eclectic middle Platonism of Antiochus of Ascalon, the last product of Academic development.