[1] The court held that the procedures required by the ICWA to end parental rights do not apply when the child has never lived with the father.

In 2009, a couple from South Carolina, Matthew and Melanie Capobianco, sought to adopt a child whose father, Dusten Brown, was an enrolled member of the Cherokee Nation, and whose mother, Christina Maldonado, was predominantly Hispanic.

The case received extensive coverage in the national media, and spurred calls for Congress to review and make amendments to the 1978 law.

[3] In some cases, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) paid the states to remove tribal children, and to place them with non-Native American families and religious groups.

[28] Under South Carolina law, a father's parental rights terminate when he neither provides pre-birth support nor becomes involved with the child shortly after birth.

[39] The Capobiancos argued that it takes more than mere biology to invoke the provisions of the ICWA, and under South Carolina law, a father must not only reside with the mother for the six-month period preceding the birth of the child, but also contribute to pregnancy-related expenses in order to have paternity rights.

"[43] The court noted that the Capobiancos made no efforts to comply with this requirement of federal law,[44] but had actively sought to prevent the father from obtaining custody since the child was four months old.

[53] Kittredge argued that the state standards for best interest of the child should trump those of the ICWA, and concluded that the trial court judge erred in her findings of fact.

[58] Kittredge then evaluated the ICWA, noting that South Carolina law did not allow a father in Brown's position to contest an adoption.

This included amici briefs by two former Solicitors General of the United States, Paul Clement on behalf of the guardian ad litem, and Greg Garre on behalf of the birth mother, suggesting that the Equal Protection Clause requires applying strict scrutiny to ICWA's race-based placement preferences.

This was only the second time that a case involving the ICWA had been granted review by the U.S. Supreme Court, with Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield being the first.

[67] At oral arguments on April 16, U.S. Deputy Solicitor General Edwin Kneedler also appeared, as a friend of the Birth Father.

[68] The issues presented to the court were: "⑴ Whether a non-custodial parent can invoke the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), 25 U.S.C.

"[70] Alito went on to reject the lower court's reading of the ICWA, reasoning it would discourage adoptive couples, and leave "vulnerable Indian children at a unique disadvantage in finding a permanent and loving home.

[76] To find otherwise, Alito concluded, would allow Brown to "play his ICWA trump card at the eleventh hour to override the mother's decision and the child's best interests.

[25] Noting that the majority seemed to consider the Indian placement preference "unwise," she wrote this did not license the Court "to interpret a statute with a view to averting the very consequences Congress expressly stated it was trying to bring about.

"[79] Sotomayor reasoned that the majority ignored ICWA's logical structure, and adopted a "textually backward reading" by starting its analysis with the final clause of § 1912(f).

"[25] Responding to the majority's suggestion that its reading avoids "equal protection concerns," Sotomayor noted that the Court's precedents have long held that Indian tribal membership is not an impermissible racial classification.

[81] Finally, Sotomayor stated that the majority ignored the primary purpose of the ICWA in its interpretation of § 1915(a), and noted that there was nothing to prevent the grandparents from filing a petition to adopt the child.

[90] It has also been alleged that the mainstream media has disseminated incorrect and false information that favorably portrayed the Capobiancos and captiously characterized Brown.

"[97] However, two weeks later, Abourezk clarified that the main intent of the law was to ensure that tribes had an opportunity to sign off on the adoption of tribal children.

[fn 16][99] After the Supreme Court decision, most media outlets stated that the Capobiancos won the case, although some correctly noted that they did not gain custody, nor receive an order of adoption.

[104] Munday, who ran the marketing firm Trio Solutions Inc. in Mount Pleasant, South Carolina, was responsible for making the case well-known, according to at least one source.

The group has organized protests and rallies across several states in order to push for reforms regarding the adoptions of Native American children.

[117] On September 25, 2013, the Charleston County Family Court began contempt proceedings against Brown and the Cherokee Nation for withholding Veronica in the face of the South Carolina adoption decree, which was finalized in July.

Both parties faced potential financial sanctions that could include defraying living and legal expenses for the Capobiancos during the period that Brown and the Cherokee Nation were allegedly in contempt of court.

[119] In November 2013, Matt and Melanie Capobianco filed a lawsuit in Nowata County, Oklahoma, demanding more than $1 million in court costs, accrued during their custody battle.

The Cherokees also "made clear the tribe's displeasure with the Capobianco's very public media appearances, interviews, and various fundraising schemes during the same time in which all the parties were under statutory gag order in South Carolina.

[editorializing] Conversely, legal scholars who promote tribal interests critiqued the case as a missed opportunity to rectify long-standing issues of Indian child removal.

[124] Dustin C. Jones cynically wrote that the decision "unleash[ed] a new form of invidious hostility toward Native Americans... creat[ing] of two classes of Native American parents"—one group which includes "those who remain in stereotypical, Anglo-American marital relationships" and receive full protections under the ICWA; and a second "amorphous group of parents deemed to have forfeited the parental rights deserving protection under the ICWA, merely because of their absence" (whether absent from their own choice and negligence, or due to happenstance occurrences outside of their control).