The anti-psychologistic treatment of logic originated in the works of Immanuel Kant and Bernard Bolzano.
[4] The concept of logical objectivism or anti-psychologism was further developed by Johannes Rehmke (founder of Greifswald objectivism)[5] and Gottlob Frege (founder of logicism the most famous anti-psychologist in the philosophy of mathematics), and has been the center of an important debate in early phenomenology and analytical philosophy.
[8] The psychologism dispute (German: Psychologismusstreit)[9] in 19th-century German-speaking philosophy is closely related to the contemporary internalism and externalism debate in epistemology; psychologism is often construed as a kind of internalism (the thesis that no fact about the world can provide reasons for action independently of desires and beliefs) and anti-psychologism as a kind of externalism (the thesis that reasons are to be identified with objective features of the world).
[10] Psychologism was defended by Theodor Lipps, Gerardus Heymans, Wilhelm Wundt, Wilhelm Jerusalem, Christoph von Sigwart, Theodor Elsenhans, and Benno Erdmann.
[11] Edmund Husserl was another important proponent of anti-psychologism, and this trait passed on to other phenomenologists, such as Martin Heidegger, whose doctoral thesis was meant to be a refutation of psychologism.