This page is subject to the extended confirmed restriction related to the Arab-Israeli conflict.30°31′30″N 32°19′45″E / 30.52500°N 32.32917°E / 30.52500; 32.32917 The Bar-Lev Line (Hebrew: קו בר-לב Kav Bar-Lev; Arabic: خط بارليف Khaṭṭ Barlīf) was a chain of fortifications built by Israel along the eastern bank of the Suez Canal shortly after the 1967 Arab–Israeli War, during which Egypt lost the entire Sinai Peninsula.

The sand wall and its concrete support prevented any armored or amphibious units from landing on the east bank of the Suez Canal without prior engineering preparations.

The strongpoints, which were built several stories into the sand, were on average situated less than 5 km (3 mi) from each other, but at likely crossing points they were less than 900 metres (3,000 ft) apart.

Between 500–1,000 metres (1,600–3,300 ft) behind the canal, there were prepared firing positions designed to be occupied by tanks assigned to the support of the strongpoints.

Some of the names of the strongpoints were Tasa, Maftzach, Milano, Mezach, Chizayon, Mifreket, Orcal, Budapest (the largest), Nisan, Lituf, Chashiva.

[5] To take advantage of the water obstacle, the Israelis installed an underwater pipe system to pump flammable crude oil into the Suez Canal, thereby creating a sheet of flame.

Its name came from the twenty artillery and air defense positions located on it; it also linked armored concentration areas and logistical bases.

As noted by an Israeli colonel shortly after the War of Attrition, "The line was created to provide military answers to two basic needs: first, to prevent the possibility of a major Egyptian assault on Sinai with the consequent creation of a bridgehead which could lead to all-out war; and, second, to reduce as much as possible the casualties among the defending troops.

[6] Sharon said that it would pin down large military formations, which would be sitting ducks for deadly artillery attacks,[7] but the line was completed in spring 1970.

During the Yom Kippur War, the Egyptian army, led by Chief of staff Saad El Shazly, overran the Bar-Lev Line in less than two hours due to the element of surprise and overwhelming firepower.

To deal with the massive earthen ramparts, the Egyptians used water cannons fashioned from hoses attached to dredging pumps in the canal.

In 1971, a young Egyptian officer, Baki Zaki Yousef, suggested a small, light, petrol-fueled pump as the answer to the crossing dilemma.

These cannons pumped out powerful jets of water, creating 81 breaches in the line and removing three million cubic metres of packed dirt on the first day of the war.

This problem required that the engineers emplace floors of wood, rails, stone, sandbags, steel plates, or metal nets for the passage of heavy vehicles.

Moreover, it can be argued that the concept of the line was counter-intuitive to the strengths of Israeli battle tactics, which, at their core, relied on agile mobile forces moving rapidly through the battlefield rather than utilizing a heavy reliance on fixed defenses.