Barrage (artillery)

In military usage, a barrage is massed sustained artillery fire (shelling) aimed at a series of points along a line.

Barrages typically use high-explosive shells, but may also be shrapnel, smoke, illumination, poison gas (in World War I), or potentially other chemical agents.

Barrages are usually integral with larger operations of multiple military formations, from divisions to armies, requiring days to weeks of preparation and exact planning.

Barrages remained in use in World War II and later, but only as one of a variety of artillery tactics made possible by improvements in predicted fire, target location and communications.

The moving barrage was developed during the Boer War, one of several tactical innovations instituted under command of General Redvers Buller.

[1] It was a response to Boer defensive positions, notably at Tugela Heights and effective long range rifle fire.

On the First day of the Somme, and in the later French Nivelle Offensive on the Chemin des Dames, the barrage outpaced the infantry, allowing the defenders to recover and emerge from their dug-outs, with disastrous results for the attackers.

A creeping barrage could maintain the element of surprise, with the guns opening fire only shortly before the assault troops moved off.

Infiltration tactics later proved more effective than advancing in rigid lines, and the infiltration phase of German stormtrooper attacks could not use a creeping barrage; but the opening phase of the German spring offensive (Operation Michael) was still supported by a massive creeping barrage, containing a heavy mix of gas shells.

[17] It is sometimes claimed that creeping barrage was first used during World War I in the battle of Gorlice in May 1915 (part of the Gorlice–Tarnów offensive) by General Tadeusz Rozwadowski, but in fact infantry assault was simply preceded by a four-hour shelling of the Russian defences.

Complications arose however in British protocols to prevent friendly-fire casualties which at the time dictated that shellfire was to be kept over one hundred yards away from their own uncovered infantry.

In many cases no man's land was narrower than the allowable 'safe' distance and as such the barrage did not protect the men as they went 'over the top' and advanced towards the German trenches.

By the later stages of the Battle of the Somme, the British had improved the accuracy of and confidence in their artillery fire and had learned the lessons of keeping infantry close to the barrage: the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) circulated an aerial observer's report commending a "most perfect wall of fire" followed up within 50 yards (46 m) by the infantry of 50th (Northumbrian) Division, enabling them to take a village with little opposition.

[24] By the Battle of Arras in 1917, the creeping barrage was huge and complex, with five or six lines of fire covering a depth of 2,000 yards (1,800 m) ahead of the infantry.

As each objective was reached, the barrage settled 500 yards (460 m) beyond the new position, combing back and forth to disrupt expected German counter-attacks, while some of the artillery moved forward to support the next phase of the advance.

[28] The day of the lengthy large-scale preliminary barrage had largely passed by the end of World War I, at least in Western nations, with the realisation that best results were achieved by neutralising the enemy rather than attempting his physical destruction, and that short, concentrated bombardments, including creeping barrages, were more effective in neutralising the enemy than extended bombardment.

Once open warfare returned after the breaking of the Hindenburg Line in September 1918 the British fired far fewer creeping barrages, using more lifts and concentrations instead.

[29] Attacks by tanks do not need the same form of artillery support, and the single barrage along the entire front of the advance had even been abandoned by the battle of Cambrai in 1917.

For the opening of the second Battle of El Alamein, for example, a barrage was considered by British Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery's planners, but rejected in favour of fierce concentrations on known or suspected targets in turn.

For Operation Supercharge on 1–2 November 1942, the attack in the 2nd New Zealand Division sector was preceded by a creeping barrage of 192 guns along a 4,000-yard (3,700 m) front, firing on three lines.

The artillery plan for the British attack at Wadi Akarit in April 1943 involved eight barrages in three phases ahead of the advances of 50th (Northumbrian) and 51st (Highland) Infantry Divisions.

Nevertheless, attacks rarely relied solely on a barrage for artillery support: at Wadi Akarit pre-arranged concentrations on likely targets were called down by observers in the course of the assault.

On Monte Sole, U.S. artillery fired probably its heaviest barrage of the war, 75,000 shells in a half-hour to clear the advance of the South Africans.

[35] During the Battle of Normandy, a creeping barrage fired from 344 guns preceded the opening attacks of 15th (Scottish) Infantry Division in Operation Epsom on 26 June 1944.

The true barrage of the British XXX Corps began at 09:20, building in intensity over the next hour, 500 guns shooting at a line 500 yards deep.

Some 7,000 guns and mortars were massed for the counter-attack at the battle of Stalingrad, and huge bombardments remained standard for the rest of the war.

The term Barrage as a method of fire control was not included in the 1965 ABCA artillery agreement nor its successor NATO STANAG.