[1] Himilco and Dionysius signed a peace treaty to end the conflict in 405 BC, which had left Carthage in direct or indirect control of 3/5th of Sicily.

[5] In 398 BC, Dionysius attacked the Phoenician city of Motya in Western Sicily with an army of 80,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry, along with a fleet of 200 warships and 500 transports carrying his supplies and war machines.

[6] The Sicilian Greeks and Sikans under Carthaginian dominion took this opportunity to rebel, and by the time Dionysius besieged Motya, only five cities remained in league (Segesta, Entella, Panormus and Solus among them) with Carthage.

Dionysius managed to hold the Carthaginian fleet off by catapult fire, while his men built a wooden road of planks on the isthmus north of Motya and dragged 80 triremes to the open sea.

[7] After garrisoning the city, Dionysius left 120 ships under his brother Leptines at Eryx, put Segesta under siege and retired to Syracuse for the winter.

Himilco, elected king by the Carthaginians, led the army raised by Carthage, probably 50,000 men along with 300 triremes and 600 transports[8] to Sicily.

[10] The Carthaginians then lifted the siege of Segesta, and Dionysius retired to Syracuse instead of offering battle in Western Sicily against a superior army.

[13] Himilco chose not to set up base at Messene, which would have given him control over the strait and a harbor that could house his entire fleet, and also put him in a position to hinder naval traffic between Italy and Sicily.

[13] Furthermore, the majority of the Greeks of Messana were holed up in the hill fortresses nearby, and reducing them required time, which in turn would enable Dionysius to strengthen himself for the coming battle.

Himilco on the other hand could not entirely ignore the hostile Greek fortresses in his rear, as they might cause problems once he left the site.

The city was near enough to block any Greek movements from Messana but was far enough away not to fall victim to a surprise attack, and it could serve as a future base of operations.

The Carthaginians were joined by 30,000 Sicilians (Sicels, Sikans and Elymians),[19] but it is not known what forces Himilco left behind to guard Western Sicily when he sailed to Lipara with 300 triremes and 300 transports.

Dionysius had mustered an army of 40,000 foot and 3,000 horsemen,[20] from both citizens and mercenaries (at least 10,000, if not more)[21] for attacking Motya in 398 BC, perhaps along with 40,000 Greek, Sicel and Sikan volunteers.

[22] At Catana in 397 BC Dionysius commanded 30,000 foot and 3,000 horse, which included Sicels and Sicilian Greek contingents, while part of the army was guarding Syracuse and Leontini.

Carthaginians favoured light, maneuverable crafts and they carried an extra sail for speed but fewer soldiers than their Greek counterparts.

[23] Carthaginian forces had encountered Syracusan quinqueremes at Motya and are credited with inventing the quadrireme,[24] but it is not known if these ship types were present at Catana in 397 BC.

Dionysius preferred larger and heavier ships, and with the fleet mainly being composed of quinqueremes, they carried more missile troops and marines than their Carthaginian counterparts.

As the rest of the Greek fleet came in disorder into the battle scene, the Carthaginians, formed up and ready, turned on them en masse.

On the other hand, if Dionysius could now attack and defeat the army of Himilco, Mago would be compelled to fall back to a secure base.

[35] At this juncture, worsening weather forced Mago to beach his ships, thus making the Punic fleet vulnerable to the Greek army attacks.

This decision to face a siege proved so unpopular among the Sicilian Greek allies that they deserted the army and made for their respective cities.

[35] Himilco arrived at Catana two days after the battle with the Carthaginian army,[37] his presence ensuring security of the Punic fleet.