[1][2] An Ottoman force led by the German General Friedrich Freiherr Kress von Kressenstein made a surprise attack on three and a half squadrons of the British 5th Mounted Brigade, which was widely scattered to the east of Romani.

Kress von Kressenstein's force had been active in the area since the First Suez Offensive of early 1915, when three columns attacked the Canal along the northern, central, and southern routes across the Sinai Peninsula.

In 1915, Sir Archibald Murray, the Imperial Commander in Chief of Egypt, partially addressed the threat of von Kressenstein's forces to the Suez Canal by organising the defences into three sectors.

[10] The first shipload of rails and sleepers arrived at Kantara on 10 March and, four weeks later, 16 miles (26 km) of track stretching towards Katia had been laid[11] by the Egyptian Labour Corps and Royal Engineers.

[14] The purpose of these raids was to destroy water sources on the central inland route, which had been used by the Ottomans during the First Suez Offensive in late January and early February 1915.

[3][15][17][Note 2] The Ottoman and Arab force travelled across the Sinai Peninsula on the northern route, which runs not far from the coast of the Mediterranean Sea and nearly parallel with it.

A series of oases with date palms and reliable water stretch for 15 miles (24 km) from Bir el Abd in the east to Oghratina, Katia and Romani near the Suez Canal.

[18] These oases make the northern route from the Ottoman-Egyptian Frontier at Rafa to El Arish and Romani viable, and British strategists thought it possible that 250,000 Ottoman troops could cross the Sinai, and 80,000 be based permanently in this fertile area.

[21] These regiments were deployed as follows: At Oghrantina was two squadrons of Worcestershire Hussars (less one troop), with four officers and 60 other ranks of the 2/2nd Lowland Field Company[Royal Engineers.

[21] Wiggin moved there in response to an intelligence report that an Ottoman force was at Bir el Mageibra some distance to the south and, with the agreement of his commander H. A. Lawrence, he prepared to launch a surprise attack.

[20][24] At dawn on 23 April, Wiggin found and destroyed a large but almost empty camp at Bir el Mageibra, capturing six prisoners.

They heard the sound of pumps operating at wells 500 yards (460 m) to their south west, and an officer who investigated found about sixty Ottoman soldiers.

At 09:45 a battery of mountain guns near Er Rabah opened fire on Katia from the north east, which killed or maimed some of the horses within a few minutes.

So effective was the fire that the attackers soon fell back leaving twenty dead and wounded, while an Ottoman mountain gun battery was unable to find the British positions.

At 07:00 Ottoman forces attempted to outflank the British position to the south, but were stopped by fire from a small defensive works on that flank containing one non-commissioned officer (NCO) and six men.

By 13:45 Wiggin had advanced about 1 mile (1.6 km) against very strong opposition, but soon afterwards he saw a commotion among the camels at Katia; the tents in the camp were burning and he decided that the best option was to fall back to Bir el Hamisah.

[36] These five troops and a machine gun section of Gloucestershire Hussars moved out from Romani at 10:15 to intercept a column of 500 Ottoman soldiers retiring south-east from Dueidar.

Shortly after leaving Romani, firing was heard from Katia, and from some high ground they could see the Ottoman artillery north of Er Rabah shelling the camp.

[37] The commander of 5th Mounted Brigade decided to retire towards the Suez Canal, and the two squadrons from Romani joined him, abandoning much equipment to ride overnight to Bir el Nuss.

[37] The 5th Mounted Brigade had been completely surprised; its commander and his important reserve force had been out of position at a critical time following false intelligence, and could not support his regiments.

[15][24][38] The overwhelming success of the Ottoman Army's operations during the Battle of Katia demonstrated the attacking strength and determination of Kress von Kressenstein's force in 1916, and their efficient implementation of appropriate tactics, particularly timing and false intelligence.

This success was underpinned by the Ottoman infantry's ability to make the gruelling march across the Sinai Peninsula and be fit enough to then launch attacks with force and determination.

Regular patrols and reconnaissances were carried out over the oases area, until the issue was resolved at the Battle of Romani in August 1916 when British Empire forces won a decisive victory.