General Edmund Allenby's right flank was secure but was not sufficiently broad to support the planned operations across the Jordan to the Hedjaz railway.

[1][2] During these operations a general advance on a front of 14–26 miles (23–42 km) and up to a maximum of 5–7 miles (8.0–11.3 km) in depth by both the XX and XXI Corps pushed Ottoman forces north from the River Auja on the Mediterranean coast, from Abu Tellul and Mussallabeh on the edge of the Jordan Valley and up the Jerusalem to Nablus road capturing Ras el Ain.

[5] Some preliminary operations mainly to gain better gun positions commenced on the night of 2 March when infantry from the 53rd (Welsh) Division advanced west of the Nablus road on a 3 miles (4.8 km) front from north-west of Rammun to south-west of Bir ez Zeit and the 10th (Irish) Division advanced to Beit Ello 5 miles (8.0 km) west of Bir ez Zeit.

[6] The 60th (2/2nd London) Division pushed Ottoman units back from high ground on the north bank of the Wadi Auja, well beyond the valuable water supply in the river.

The 2/24th and 2/23rd Battalions, London Regiment in the hills had difficulties and a gap of 5 miles (8.0 km) developed where an Ottoman division had given the defences an unexpected strength.

But the difficult night advance was further complicated by the terrain and Ottoman machine guns and despite reinforcements being brought forward, the infantry were held up later in the day by the cavernous gorge of the Wadi el Jib.

[10] During these operations the infantry advanced up and down precipitous cliffs and through deep gorges with every Ottoman machine gun carefully placed in strong defensive positions.

[11] The XXI Corps moved its right forward from the Wadi Deir Ballut to Ras el Ain and secured a commanding position near Abu Tellul and Musallabeh which overlooks the Jordan Valley and the Beisan to Jericho road.

[12] The final line captured was found to be overlooked on all sides so a slight retirement to the heights just to the south was made and the positions consolidated.