The two sides contested the town of Ramadi in central Iraq, about 100 km (62 miles) west of Baghdad on the south bank of the Euphrates River, where an important Ottoman garrison was quartered.

The lessons learned were utilised in the second battle two months later: the British adopted different tactics and trapped the garrison against the Euphrates, cutting off their lines of escape.

Although this had some tactical advantages for the British in that floodwaters would make the area west of Baghdad impassable, it also carried with it the risk – which was deemed unacceptable – that the Samarra and Musaiyib railways would be threatened and Fallujah cut off.

General Frederick Stanley Maude decided that an operation should be mounted to occupy Dhibban and strike against the Turkish garrison at Ramadi, which was said to number "about 120 sabres, 700 rifles and 6 [artillery] guns"[4] – in total about 1,000 men.

[5] One observer noted that the Baghdadis called it "the hottest season in the memory of man" and commented that the extreme heat made most things too hot even to touch: "The rim of a tumbler burnt one's hand in a tent.

"[4] Maude considered postponing the operation but was advised by General Alexander Cobbe to go ahead on the grounds that the weather was unlikely to get cooler and that all possible precautions were being taken to minimise the impact of the heat.

A column was assembled at Fallujah consisting of the 7th (Ferozepore) Brigade, two cavalry squadrons, fourteen artillery pieces, four armoured cars and half a sapper and miner company.

By this time the Turks had assembled a joint Turco-German force called the Yilderim ("Thunderbolt") Army Group, under the command of the German General Erich von Falkenhayn.

The threat never materialised, however, as the Germans were unable to complete the railway lines that were needed to support their troops in the field and the Yilderim Army Group was redirected to the Palestine front.

The division joined Brigadier General A. W. Andrew's 50th Indian Brigade at Falluja and set up forward positions at Madhij, east of Ramadi, by 20 September.

The Turks had assumed that the British would repeat the tactics they used in July and organised their defences accordingly to cover an arc running from the east to the south of the town.

A pontoon bridge was built at Madhij on 28 September, troops were encamped along the river, and friendly Arab tribes were recruited to move supplies to the riverbank opposite Ramadi.

The garrison's last escape route was now the Aziziya Bridge just to the west of Ramadi and, as the battle continued into the night under bright moonlight, a column of Turkish infantry sought to fight its way out of the trap at 03:00 on 29 September.

[14] Heavy British machine gun and artillery fire repelled them and drove the survivors back to Ramadi after an hour and half of fighting.

[16] The 39th Garhwal Rifles attacked the bridge, charging Turkish guns firing over open sights, and took it by 07:30 despite suffering heavy casualties; only 100 men from the three assaulting companies made it through.

[17] At 09:15, large numbers of Turks began surrendering to the Garhwalis at the bridge; by 09:30, as the rest of the British force advanced towards the mud walls of Ramadi, "white flags went up all along the enemy's line".

[18] The Turkish surrender came just in time, as a powerful sandstorm began shortly afterwards which reduced visibility to a few metres; had it struck earlier, the garrison could easily have slipped away.

The fall of the town was so sudden that on the day after the battle a German pilot attempted to land at Ramadi before he realised who now occupied it and made a hasty escape.