The Ottomans employed a strategy which demanded highly mobile troops, capable of arriving at specified objectives at precise times.

[15][16] Some sources estimate the significance of the battle as one of the most important in the company, as a result of which the 3rd army was so defeated that it was forced to stop fighting for a while.

After the Ottoman Empire entered the war in October 1914 on the side of the Central Powers, Russia now feared a Caucasus Campaign aimed at retaking Kars and the port of Batum.

As a longer-term goal, head of the Ottoman war ministry İsmail Enver hoped a success would facilitate opening the route to Tbilisi and beyond, which in turn would trigger a revolt of Caucasian Muslims.

On 30 October 1914, the 3rd Army headquarters was informed by High Command in Constantinople about the Ottoman navy's bombardment of the Russian ports of Novorossiysk, Odessa and Sevastopol in the Black Sea.

Another reason for greater number of non-combat loss of Ottomans was inadequate rear services, logistic and sanitary measures.

[26] The war zone was nearly 1,250–1,500 kilometers (780–930 miles) wide from the Black Sea to Lake Van, which made military concentration difficult.

A detachment unit (1 infantry regiment and the Special Organization (Teşkilat-I Mahsusa) volunteers) known as Ştanke Bey Müfrezesi under the command of the German Lieutenant Colonel Stange embarked Artvin to reinforce the offense and pin down the Russians.

In the farthest left flank, Hafız Hakkı with X Corps, numbering 40.000 fresh troops, attacked General Istomin's Brigade (8.000 infantry, 1.000 cavalry) on 22 December.

Enver Pasha set up guards in the supply depots to prevent looting of the village, thus the mistake in Oltu didn't happen.

He claimed that since Turks were encircling their right flank, they should occupy Bardız Village in order to cover the road to Sarikamish where the Russian railway passed, and that an offensive on the main front was unnecessary.

[35] On night of 24 December, Enver and his headquarters (Bronsart Pasha, Feldmann Bey and Colonel Guse, all of which were German officers) reached Bardız village from Narman in 14 hours on horseback.

On the evening of 25 December, two regiments of the 29th Division, under the orders of Enver Pasha, entered the forest to encircle the Russian troops defending Bardız Pass.

Hundreds of soldiers froze to death in the forest filled with ditches and cliffs, reducing the 29th Division's number by 50 percent.

Hafız Hakkı left a regiment to fight against Istomin's detachment and entered the Allahekber Mountains to cut the Sarıkamış-Kars railway line.

[40] These memoirs concurred with Ali İhsan Pasha's (IX Corps commander at that time) interview with the Russian newspaper after his captivity where he stated that he had a total of 6,000 soldiers.

[41][37] On the other hand, Turk sources claimed Turkish army had suffered heavy casualties as a result of Enver Pasha's offensive orders described in short " attack without considering casualties", and in addition, the number of the Turkish army was less than the Russian troops defending Sarikamish and was very tired after days of marching.

5 Turkestan battalions appointed by Yudenich attacked towards Bardız and defeated the 82nd Regiment of the 28th Division, which was defending the Çakırtepe hills, with a bayonet charge.

Observing this, the 32nd Division Commander Lieutenant Colonel Abdülkerim Bey gave up the idea of moving to Sarikamish and went to battle against Turkestan battalions.

Meanwhile, Hafız Hakkı Bey sent a cavalry regiment on 27 December, occupied Selim station and destroyed the Sarikamish-Kars railway from there.

On the same day, Stange Bey, who had an infantry regiment and Special Organization irregulars under his command, captured Ardahan, which was defended by three battalions of the 3rd Plaston Brigade (2,000 soldiers).

On morning of 28 December, he left Mecingirt riding horses and set off first to Kağızman, then from Gyumri to Tbilisi.,[49][50] He did not appoint a commander-in-chief in his place.

Therefore, Russian force in Sarıkamish increased to 20 infantry battalions, a cavalry regiment, 34 cannons and several score of machine guns under commander of 1st Plastun Brigade General Przevalski.

On 31 December, arrival of 154th Derbenski regiment brought by Bergmann in person, carried the active fighting strength available to 7000 men.

[2] Colonel Bukretov took six battalions of reinforcements from General Przevalski to his detachment and attacked Bardız Pass, which defended by 28th Division and 86th Regiment.

Colonel Maslannikov, who was replaced after Bukretov's resignation, captured the Bardız Pass on January 2 with the reinforcement of these three Turkestan battalions.

Infantry regiment left by X Corps against General Istomin on December 26, before entering Allahu Ekber Mountains, had also reduced to 2000 soldiers.

[68][69] As a result of the insistence of Enver Pasha on January 6, the offensive started and no success could be achieved except for the Russian forces being pushed back a little.

However, due to these wrong decisions made by Enver and Hafız Hakkı Pasha, this battle resulted in a complete disaster for Turks.

After that, they took about 100,000 people from their reserves in a short time and formed an additional 17 battalions, as well as replenishing existing units that were reduced in Winter Campaign.