The engagement was the first in a series of assaults by the Tigris Corps to try to break through the Ottoman lines to relieve the besieged garrison at Kut.

Following the capture, Force "D"'s mission in Mesopotamia expanded gradually as local commanders saw a chance for victories which would burnish the British Empire's prestige in the Muslim world.

Secretary of State for India, Austen Chamberlain objected to the proposed advance because of his concern that even if Baghdad could be captured, it would only be lost again because no other troops were available to reinforce Force "D".

After early attempts to storm the town failed, the Ottoman forces investing Kut opted to starve the defenders into submission.

Instead of launching any raids or sorties, Townshend dug his troops in around the town of Kut, and across the river at the village the soldier's nicknamed "Woolpress", and awaited rescue.

At the first sign that the pontoon bridge, the primary link between Kut and Woolpress, was threatened by the Ottoman siege lines, Townshend ordered it destroyed.

With pressure from both Townshend in Kut and Nixon in Basra, Aylmer succumbed to their demands and began his advance upriver as soon as his he had collected three full brigades of infantry.

The Indian Army's reserve system, never fully developed before the war, was overtaxed trying to resupply the division's battalions with fresh, trained sepoys.

It took time to teach language and cultural skills necessary to deal with the various castes, religions, and ethnicities that made up the Indian Army.

[10] As an added insult, when the Meerut and Lahore Divisions were withdrawn from France, they ceased receiving combat pay, even though they were being shipped Egypt, under threat from Ottoman force, and then to Mesopotamia, to actively take part in an offensive.

During their time in France, the Indian Corps divisions had been brought up to date with the latest weaponry, including flare guns and bombs.

Upriver waited the Ottoman Sixth Army under the command of Field Marshal Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz.

Recalled from retirement to join the military mission to Germany's ally, von der Goltz had been given command of the Ottoman Sixth Army in October 1915.

After two attempts to take Kut by storm failed, von der Goltz, over the objections of his senior Ottoman officers, opted to starve the defenders into submission.

Because Townshend's intentions were still unknown to the Sixth Army, von der Goltz had to commit a substantial portion of his command to maintaining the siege lines.

[14] The 52nd Division had arrived in region in time to take part in the Battle of Ctesiphon and the early stages of the siege of Kut.

[15] Between them, the 35th and 52nd Divisions would be able to muster approximately 9000 infantry, 20 artillery pieces, a brigade of cavalry, as well as a group of mounted Arab irregulars.

Unable to resist pressure any longer, Aylmer ordered Younghusband to advance upriver with the 19th, 28th, and 35th Indian Brigades on 3 January 1916.

Aylmer remained behind at Ali Gharbi, awaiting further reinforcements already en route before moving to combine with Younghusband's force.

[17] Younghusband would later write, ""Having no cavalry, or aeroplanes, or other means of reconnoitring, and the country being as flat as a billiard table, the only way of reconnoitering the Ottomans was to march on, till we bumped into them.

Lacking any elevated ground, effective aerial reconnaissance, or sufficient cavalry, the British and Indian troops had to feel their to discover where the Ottoman positions started and ended.

On the left bank, the failure to push through a concerted attack allowed them to hold their position without revealing the extent of the defenses.

On the right bank, the Ottoman troops began to give way in the afternoon, allowing Kemball's brigade to occupy the forward trenches of the defenses.

The morning fog, which would have helped to cover their advance was allowed to dissipate because Kemball was under orders to wait until the attack started on the left bank.

Some of the wounded had to wait as much as ten days before they were finally cleared through the field ambulances before being sent to the hospitals established downriver at Basra.

Although General Nixon, in his dispatch to the War Office, would estimate that the Ottoman forces had suffered 4,400 casualties, this number is suspect.

Furthermore, there were many reports that the artillery fire, due to the lack of good observation points and the Ottoman camouflage efforts, was ineffective.

Despite the casualties, Aylmer could not afford to spend much time waiting for the arrival of the second division of reinforcements still working its way upriver to the front.

Although considered a British victory (albeit a costly one), the Ottoman forces had achieved their goal in delaying the Tigris Corps.

They had bloodied Aylmer's forces, using up time which the Kut garrison believed it did not have and reinforcements which were hard for the British and Indian governments to replace.