Fighting took place in an area bordered by the Bethlehem–Nablus road in the west, the Jordan River in the east, and north of a line from Jerusalem to the Dead Sea.

Extensive developments were also required along the lines of communication to ensure that front-line troops were adequately supplied, approximately 150 miles (240 km) from their main bases at Moascar and Kantara on the Suez Canal.

The area was garrisoned by Ottoman troops entrenched on hill-tops which the British infantry, Australian light horse and New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigades attacked.

It would also prevent raids into the country to the west of the Dead Sea and provide a narrow starting point for operations against the Hedjaz Railway.

[13] All the main wadis run from west to east; often with steep high banks, while the tributaries joined from all directions, breaking up the ridges making the hills, almost impossible to cross.

While the infantry attacks were progressing along the road between Jerusalem and Jericho on 19 February, the two brigades of the Anzac Mounted Division were to move in a flanking movement towards Nebi Musa.

Aircraft patrols were then directed to fly over Jericho and Shunet Nimrin on the western and eastern sectors of the Jordan Valley on alternate days.

These patrols closely watched and reported tactical details, including the number of tents and camps, the state of supply dumps, the conditions of roads and tracks, and traffic on the railway.

To the north-east of El Muntar Iraq Ibrahim, during a further advance by the 2/20th Battalion, London Regiment along a narrow ridge on the south bank of the Wadi Fara, they captured the high ground suffering 66 casualties.

[32] On the right, the 179th Brigade column marched towards Jebel Ekteif (to the south of Talat ed Dumm); their 2/13th Battalion, London Regiment, however, faced a sheer drop of over twenty feet (6.1 m) and had to proceed across intervening ridges into parallel wadis, arriving too late for the attack.

Because of the terrain they moved in single file: the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade was strung out from five to eight miles (8.0–13 km), and it was hours before the long column could deploy for the attack.

But Nebi Musa was strongly held by entrenched Ottoman soldiers supported by artillery, which made it impossible to move on: the attack was postponed until the next day.

They moved down the Wadi Qumran to the Jordan Valley, following a goat track which fell 1,300 feet (400 m) in two miles (3.2 km) to get into position to attack Nebi Musa from the rear.

[34][35] Under cover of darkness, the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade advanced north along a very rough track and by daylight had reached just east of the Neby Musa position.

[39] The Canterbury Mounted Rifles Regiment occupied Neby Musa at daylight after crossing the gorge on foot to find the Ottoman garrison had withdrawn with their guns.

[35] Divisional Headquarters Staff set up their report centre about one mile (1.6 km) behind Jericho; when they were sitting down to a morning cup of tea, Chetwode and Chauvel joined them.

Considerable Ottoman reinforcements were seen to arrive at Shunet Nimrin on the eastern side of the Jordan River, and an aerial raiding formation from No.

[42][43][44] Ottoman troops on the western bank of the Jordan River were holding a strong bridgehead at Ghoraniyeh, protecting the old stone bridge on the main Jerusalem to Es Salt road.

[42] The Auckland Mounted Rifle Regiment patrolled the Jordan River and valley area under enemy observation, attracting artillery shelling from Ottoman field guns.

Deir Hijla) until 25 February when all Ottoman troops, guns and a pontoon bridge were found to have been removed to the east bank of the river.

[15][21][45] Ottoman army garrisons continued to hold the Hedjaz railway from Deraa to Medina (although the line was harassed and cut by insurgent Arab units) and Cemal's VIII and XII Corps guarded the northern Levantine coast with four infantry divisions.

[47] On 6 March the War Cabinet gave Allenby leave to advance "to the maximum extent possible, consistent with the safety of the force under his orders".

[Note 3] On 21 March an attempt to cut the Hedjaz railway at Amman began; this coincided with the launch of the German spring offensive by Ludendorff against the Allies on the Western Front.