The Nationalist command engineered an offensive which aimed at wiping out a large Republican salient, potentially threatening the only railway line connecting rebel-held León and Andalusia.

[2] The Nationalists removed a threat to their logistics and seized some 5,000 square km, though the battle did not turn into a major breakthrough which decided the fate of the conflict.

[3] However, the Battle of the Mérida pocket merits attention as a unique example of pincer strategy employed during the war, since most offensives of the conflict were carried out by means of a frontal assault.

It was sparsely populated; the largest urban centres were Don Benito (20,000 inhabitants), Villanueva de la Serena (15,000), Campanario (10,000) and Castuera (9,000).

[7] The chief Republican planner, general Rojo, already in May 1937 engineered a scheme, named "Plan P"; it envisioned a massive breakthrough offensive from the salient towards Portugal, but was abandoned due to political, not military reasons.

On 17 June lieutenant colonel Antonio Barroso, a high planning officer in Nationalist General Staff, came out with an idea of mounting an offensive which would wipe out the Merida Salient.

[10] He devised a plan based on pincer strategy, which would involve parallel attack from the north and the south of the salient, possibly trapping most of the enemy forces in a cauldron.

The document acknowledged concentration of Republican troops in Maestrazgo and Levante, which presumably was carried out at the expense of other sections of the front, including Extremadura.

Intelligence services of the Republican Ejército de Extremadura have correctly identified enemy gear-up north of the salient, in Trujillo and Zorita, though they failed to note similar preparations south.

On 19 July 1938 the Nationalists opened artillery barrage and mounted an infantry assault on the Republican bridgehead on the Tagus at Puente del Arzobispo, some 100 km from the Merida Pocket and at the extreme right flank of the Ejército de Extremadura.

[18] The weather was typical for Extremadura in the summer period: extreme heat made daytime operations very difficult, though on the other hand low waters rendered most rivers relatively easy to cross.

Burillo was primarily concerned about would-be Nationalist takeover of the Almorchón railway junction, gradually within reach of right-wing unit advancing from the south.

He started to re-group his units in order to form a makeshift División Zújar, supposed to deliver a counter-attack which would push the Nationalists back.

Division first resisted renewed night Republican counter-attacks, then crossed a low range of Sierra de Benquerencia and the town of the same name, and during the afternoon hours approached and seized Castuera, reaching the railway line Merida - Almorchón.

With the fall of Castuera the exit gap from the Merida Pocket was reduced to some 20 km and it was clear that División Zújar would never become an operational unit, as its points of concentration were getting overran by the enemy.

Division, which proceeded south-east; following few hours, some 7 km march, waddling at numerous points across lower Zújar and with some sporadic combat, it reached Campanario.

Already in the afternoon local Nationalist commanders wired that "dos batallones rojos" intended to break through, though eventually most of the troops surrendered and there were 1.070 POWs and 2 artillery pieces taken over reported this day.

Cavalry units started to patrol the corridor which blocked the pocket from the east, while other Nationalist sub-units were gradually reinforcing the barrier as they were arriving.

The Nationalists claimed also having seized some 170 machine-guns, 10 tanks, 18 artillery pieces and 19 railway carriages, which served as part of the armoured train, apart from numerous rifles, supplies, munition and other vehicles.

It was only following 2 weeks of combat that in mid-August the Nationalists seized Almorchón and Cabeza del Buey; however, they failed to make incursions into the Ciudad Real province.

[citation needed] Following collapse of the Mérida pocket a wave of personal changes in command of Ejército de Extremadura occurred; most of them took place before August 1938.

Corps coronel Rúbert was dismissed by Burillo; he would not be assigned any major command post, to leave Spain and die in unknown circumstances on exile.

[27] Coronel Burillo was dismissed from command of Army of Extremadura (and expulsed from the PCE) and performed minor roles, including leading the Madrid police.

He joined the Casado Coup but was apprehended by the Nationalists at the quays of Alicante in late March 1939; he was sentenced to death by military tribunal, and then executed in July 1939.