[5][1][6][7] The East India Company had farmed out tax collection on account of a shortage of trained administrators, and the prevailing uncertainty may have worsened the famine's impact.

[25][26] It proved disastrous to the mulberries and cotton grown in Bengal; as a result, a large proportion of the dead were spinners and weavers who had no reserves of food.

[citation needed] In the 17th century, the English East India Company was granted the town of Calcutta by the Mughal Prince Shah Shuja.

In 1757, at the Battle of Plassey, the East India Company defeated the nawab Siraj Ud Daulah, annexing large portions of Bengal afterwards.

[citation needed] In addition to profits from trade, the Company had been granted rights of taxation in 1764 and within a few years, had raised land revenue collections by about 30%.

[33] On 18 September 1769, Naib Nazim of Dhaka Mohammed Reza Khan informed Harry Verelst, President of the Council at Fort William about the "dryness of the season".

[35] The same month, John Cartier, Esquire (and Second-in-Command) of the Council chose to inform the Court of Directors in London about impending famine-like conditions in Bengal — a century later, W. W. Hunter would note this letter to be the "only serious intimation" about the approaching famine, and find the absence of President Verelst's affirmation to be striking.

[35] On 7 December, Reza Khan and Shitab Rai proposed to the Council that they enforce a humane grain collection scheme for the upcoming fiscal year, in proportion to the individual produce of peasants.

[35] Despite initial hopes of a reversal in fortunes, there were no rains and the spring harvest was scanty; acting upon the advice of Reza Khan, the Council chose to increase taxes by 10% to meet revenue targets.

[33][38] In October 1769, the Company requested that storehouses be constructed in Patna and Murshidabad; city officials were instructed to prevent monopoly of trade and have farmers raise "every sort" of dry grain, that was possible.

[35] The proposal was approved and the Council borne about 46% of the expenditure, the remaining sum were paid by Nawab Najabat Ali, Khan himself, Rai Durlabh, and Jagat Seth.

[33] Export-import embargoes were set up to check prices but they only contributed to worsening the situation — the province had no money to pay for the scarce produces and trade effectively ceased.

[33] On 12 July, Becher claimed that 500 people were dying in Murshidabad every day and the condition was far worse in the rural hinterlands; cannibalism was apparently on exhibition.

[38] Rajat Dutta, in a revisionist history of the economy of Bengal Province, claimed these figures to be "inflated" and carry "little conviction"; a revised toll of 1.2 million dead (~ 4-5% of the population) was put forward.

[39] Tim Dyson supports Dutta's claims of inflation, and notes the "popular" figure of ten million, indicative of at-least a 500% increase in annual death rate, to be "barely credible".

[38] Highlighted are the facts that contemporary Bengal lacked any significant demographic data outside Calcutta, the few reliable reports on effects of the famine were based on unrepresentative populations, and many cultivators were mobile settlers who simply migrated to better-off territories.

[38] The 1770 monsoons brought some marginal relief, and a perspective on the rampant depopulation — a letter by the Council regretted the wiping out of numerous "industrious peasants and manufacturers".