[11] In light of the rapid advances in biotechnology, biodefense expert Daniel Gerstein has described the BWC as "the most important arms control treaty of the twenty-first century".

[25][26] The negotiations gained further momentum when the United States decided to unilaterally end its offensive biological weapons program in 1969 and support the British proposal.

For example, Filippa Lentzos and Gregory Koblentz pointed out in 2016 that "crucial contemporary debates about new developments" for the BWC Review Conferences included "gain-of-function experiments, potential pandemic pathogens, CRISPR and other genome editing technologies, gene drives, and synthetic biology".

While these agents may be employed for nefarious ends, they also have several legitimate peaceful purposes, including developing medicines and vaccines to counter natural or deliberate disease outbreaks.

[53] Which implementing measures are adequate for a state depends on several factors, including its legal system, its size and geography, the development of its biotechnology industry, and its participation in regional economic cooperation.

[11] In 2018, the BWC's Implementation Support Unit issued a background document describing a number of additional understandings and agreements on Article VII that have been reached at past Review Conferences.

[42] The Seventh Review Conference in 2011 established an Article X database, which matches voluntary requests and offers for assistance and cooperation among States Parties and international organizations.

[62][76] These politically binding[77] reports aim to prevent or reduce the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions, and at improving international cooperation on peaceful biological activities.

[78] Unlike the chemical or nuclear weapons regimes, the BWC lacks both a system to verify states' compliance with the treaty and a separate international organization to support the convention's effective implementation.

U.S. biological weapons expert Jonathan B. Tucker commented that "this lack of an enforcement mechanism has undermined the effectiveness of the BWC, as it is unable to prevent systematic violations".

[72] Subsequently, a Special Conference of BWC States Parties in 1994 considered the VEREX report and decided to establish an Ad Hoc Group to negotiate a legally-binding verification protocol.

[85][86] Many analysts, including Matthew Meselson and Amy Smithson, criticized the U.S. decision as undermining international efforts against non-proliferation and as contradicting U.S. government rhetoric regarding the alleged biological weapons threat posed by Iraq and other U.S.

For instance, during the 2019 Meeting of Experts "several States Parties stressed the urgency of resuming multilateral negotiations aimed at concluding a non-discriminatory, legally-binding instrument dealing with (...) verification measures".

[88] Notably, the Biden administration seems to reconsider the U.S. position on verification, as demonstrated by U.S. ambassador Bonnie Jenkins calling on the 2021 BWC Meeting of States Parties to "establish a new expert working group to examine possible measures to strengthen implementation of the Convention, increase transparency, and enhance assurance of compliance".

[13] Despite being a party and depositary to the BWC, the Soviet Union has operated the world's largest, longest, and most sophisticated biological weapons program, which goes back to the 1920s under the Red Army.

[93] The Soviet program employed up to 65,000 people in several hundred facilities[91] and successfully weaponized several pathogens, such as those responsible for smallpox, tularemia, bubonic plague, influenza, anthrax, glanders, and Marburg fever.

[98][99] Western concerns about Soviet compliance with the BWC increased during the late 1980s and were supported by information provided by several defectors, including Vladimir Pasechnik and Ken Alibek.

[91] Similarly, as of 2021, the U.S. Department of State "assesses that the Russian Federation (Russia) maintains an offensive [biological weapons] program and is in violation of its obligation under Articles I and II of the BWC.

[101] Starting around 1985 under Saddam Hussein's leadership, Iraq weaponized anthrax, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin, and other agents,[102] and created delivery vehicles, including bombs, missile warheads, aerosol generators, and spray systems.

[44] Iraq deliberately obstructed, delayed, and deceived the UNSCOM investigations and only admitted to having operated an offensive biological weapons program under significant pressure in 1995.

[108] In recent years, Russia has repeatedly alleged that the United States is supporting and operating biological weapons facilities in the Caucasus and Central Asia, in particular the Richard Lugar Center for Public Health Research in the Republic of Georgia.

[64] After a decade of negotiations, the major effort to institutionally strengthen the BWC failed in 2001, which would have resulted in a legally binding protocol to establish an Organization for the Prohibition of Biological Weapons (OPBW).

[114] The ISU was initially composed of three full-time staff with a budget smaller than the average McDonald's restaurant,[116] and does not compare with the institutions established to deal with chemical or nuclear weapons.

Bringing bioterrorism within the convention's scope by agreeing that it applies to all international, national and non-State actors and that it covers all relevant current and future scientific and technological developments.

[11] MX: 2 weeks 2. national mechanisms to establish and maintain the security and oversight of pathogenic microorganisms and toxins 3. enhancing international capabilities for responding to, investigating and mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease 4. strengthening and broadening national and international institutional efforts and existing mechanisms for the surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious diseases affecting humans, animals, and plants 5. the content, promulgation, and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists MX: 1 week 2.

Oversight, education, awareness-raising, and adoption and/or development of codes of conduct with the aim of preventing misuse in the context of advances in bio-science and biotechnology research with the potential of use for purposes prohibited by the Convention 5.

Provision of assistance and coordination with relevant organizations upon request by any State Party in the case of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons, including improving national capabilities for disease surveillance, detection and diagnosis and public health systems MX: 1 week 2. Review of developments in the field of science and technology related to the Convention 3.

How to strengthen implementation of Article VII, including consideration of detailed procedures and mechanisms for the provision of assistance and cooperation by States Parties MX: 5 separate meetings across 8 days 2. Review of developments in the field of science and technology related to the Convention 3.

[131] For example, a 2019 report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute finds that "advances in three specific emerging technologies—additive manufacturing (AM), artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics—could facilitate, each in their own way, the development or production of biological weapons and their delivery systems".

[134] Second, biotechnological equipment and even dangerous pathogens and toxins cannot be prohibited altogether since they also have legitimate peaceful or defensive purposes, including the development of vaccines and medical therapies.