[3] The timing of the agreement was related to the scheduled launching of the German cruiser Prinz Eugen by the Hungarian first lady, Magdolna Purgly, on 22 August.
The Hungarian government believed that its position towards Germany would be strengthened if it had a pact with the Little Entente completed by the time that officials from both countries would meet in Kiel for the cruiser's launch.
Kánya suggested that the Bled agreement might be invalidated by making demands on the Entente and that Hungary's armed forces would be prepared to partake in a Czechoslovak conflict as early as 1 October.
[3] The method proposed by Kánya to the Germans to invalidate the Bled agreement was to "make excessive demands on the matter of the [Hungarian] minorities in the Little Entente states".
The Permanent Council of the Little Entente recognised that "in existing circumstances the League of Nations cannot completely carry out the tasks entrusted to it by the authors of the Covenant".
[10] A communiqué of the Yugoslav government, dated 31 August, clarified that Yugoslavia "had not renounced her prior obligations" by signing the Bled agreement.
Hermann Göring, however, told the Hungarian government on 9 September that the Yugoslav regent, Prince Paul, had assured him that he would "in no circumstances intervene against Hungary, not even if the latter got involved in a conflict with Czechoslovakia".
The official Hungarian position had been that Hungary had a right to re-arm, but the Bled agreement gave it legal cover so that the re-armament programme could shed its nominal secrecy.
In March 1935, the Director of the Aviation Office, who was de facto commander of the secret air force, urged "set[ting] the goal that we become a serious opponent towards at least one of the surrounding Little Entente states".
In the end, the air force was not needed, as Italy and Germany mediated the First Vienna Award, which solved Hungary's revisionist claims on Czechoslovakia without war.