European foreign policy of the Chamberlain ministry
According to a report by the British Chiefs of Staff in 1937, which had much influence on Chamberlain: Even today we could face without apprehension an emergency either in the Far East or the Mediterranean, provided that we were free ... to concentrate sufficient strength in one or other of these areas ...
[2] Moreover, the economic capability to provide for a sufficient military force to meet all worldwide defence commitments did not exist, which meant a greater reliance on diplomacy would be needed to reduce to the number of potential enemies.
[9] Because of a lack of indigenous sources, much of the steel, instruments, aircraft and machine tools that were needed for rearmament had to be purchased abroad, but increased military production reduced the number of factories devoted to exports, which would lead to a serious balance of payments problem.
One of Chamberlain's early foreign policy goals was to seek a "general settlement" to win German acceptance and guarantee a peaceful Europe by settling all of the grievances that he considered to be justified.
[22] As part of his policy to reduce the number of Britain's potential enemies, Chamberlain greatly stressed the use of the Gentlemen's Agreement in January 1937 as the basis of winning Italy back to the Western fold.
[23] After strong pressure from Eden, the Nyon Conference was called in September 1937, and the British and French navies agreed to patrol the Mediterranean to suppress "piracy", a euphemism for Italian attacks.
The plan foundered on 3 March 1938, when Nevile Henderson, the British Ambassador in Berlin, presented Chamberlain's proposal to Hitler, who rejected the idea on the grounds that Germany should not have to negotiate for any bit of Africa, and he announced that he was prepared to wait ten years or longer for a unilateral return of the former colonies.
[33] As part of its policy to try to win Italy away from Germany by reducing that country's involvement in Spain, Chamberlain's cabinet slowly dismantled the powers of the Non-Intervention Committee for the Spanish Civil War in 1937, and it was silent in relation to the gradual ostracism of to the leftist Juan Negrín government from that organisation.
In early 1938, the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) informed Chamberlain that it could be reasonably expected that a German strategic bombing offensive against Britain would result in half-a-million civilian deaths within the first three weeks.
[49] Finally, as a result of intense French and especially British diplomatic pressure, Czechoslovak President Edvard Beneš unveiled on 5 September 1938 the Fourth Plan for constitutional reorganisation of his country, which granted most of the demands for Sudeten autonomy that had been made by Konrad Henlein in his Karlsbad speech in April 1938 and so threatened to deprive the Germans of their pretext for aggression.
[53] The instigator of Plan Z was Chamberlain's political advisor and spin doctor, Sir Joseph Ball; as Director of the Conservative Research Department, he and Horace Wilson were chief proponents of appeasement.
[68] The Munich Agreement, engineered by the French and British governments, effectively allowed Hitler to annexe the country's defensive frontier, leaving its industrial and economic core within a day's reach of the Wehrmacht.
[74] One comic aspect was that after considerable debate within Whitehall, Chamberlain ruled that for the sake of keeping Greece out of the German economic sphere of influence British smokers would have to endure Greek tobacco, which was regarded as inferior in Britain.
[80] The Chamberlain government would have liked to have enlisted the United States to present an Anglo-American front to stop the Japanese war against China, but the unwillingness of the Roosevelt administration to take such a step precluded a more active British policy in the Far East.
[85] The assurances provided by the COS that Britain could repel and survive a German attempt at "knock out blow" in 1939 played a significant role in the change in emphasis in Chamberlain's foreign policy that year.
In late 1938, Chancellor of the Exchequer John Simon reported to the Cabinet that the increased military spending that Chamberlain agreed to in 1937 and 1938 was leading to inflation, high interest rates, a balance of payments crisis and the danger that British financial reserves (the so-called "fourth arm of the defense") would be used up.
False reports, very likely planted by the Chief of the Abwehr, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, suggested that the Germans were planning to invade the Netherlands in February 1939 to use Dutch airfields to launch a strategic bombing offensive to achieve a "knock-out blow" against Britain, by razing its cities to the ground.
[97] Newman maintained that British foreign policy under Chamberlain aimed at denying Germany a "free hand" anywhere in Europe, and any concessions that were offered were caused by military weaknesses, compounded by the economic problems of rearmament.
[103] On the other hand, the Polish historian Anna Cienciala described Newman's views as wrong and argued the British and the French wanted to avoid war by pressuring the Poles to make concessions.
[106] Wesley Wark has maintained that the guarantee was an intermediate stage between the commitments Chamberlain made to defend Western Europe in early 1939 for reasons of British national security and the moral crusade to destroy Germany that began with the outbreak of war in September 1939.
[107] Maurice Cowling made a Primat der Innenpolitik ("primacy of domestic politics") argument by claiming the guarantee reflected domestic British party manoeuvring between the Conservative and Labour Parties and had nothing to do with foreign policy considerations[100] Additional reasons for the guarantee were suggested by the Canadian historian Bruce Strang, who argued that Chamberlain was increasingly convinced by March 1939, much as much he disliked the prospect, that a war with Germany was appearing increasingly inevitable and so Britain would need at least massive American economic support.
[109] A major crisis in French-Italian relations had started on 30 November 1938, when Mussolini ordered the Italian Chamber of Deputies to stage "spontaneous" demonstrations demanding that France cede Nice, Corsica, Tunisia and French Somaliland.
Confirming Chamberlain on his "containment" policy of Germany in 1939 was information supplied by Carl Friedrich Goerdeler to the effect that the German economy was on the verge of collapsing by the weight of heavy military spending.
[114] In addition, Goerdeler reported that Hitler could be deterred from war by a forceful British diplomatic stand in favour of Poland and that his regime would then collapse on its own accord by the disintegration of the German economy.
[133] On 26 June 1939, the Royal Navy reported that the only way of ending the blockade was to send the main British battle fleet to the Far East and that the current crisis in Europe of Germany threatening Poland made that militarily inadvisable.
[133] In addition, Chamberlain faced strong pressure from the French not to weaken British naval strength in the Mediterranean because of the danger that Mussolini might honour the Pact of Steel if war broke out in Europe.
[136] Though Chamberlain was firmly determined to resist aggression, he had not abandoned the prospect of appeasement and peaceful revision in the talks in London between the British Government's Chief Industrial Advisor, Sir Horace Wilson, a close friend and associate of Chamberlain, and Helmut Wohlat of the Four Year Plan Office in July 1939, Wilson made it clear that if Hitler abandoned his aggressive course against Poland, London would be willing to discuss the peaceful return of Danzig and the Polish Corridor, colonial restoration, economic concessions, disarmament and an Anglo-German commitment to refrain from war against each other, all of which was of absolutely no significance to Hitler.
In his letter to Hitler, Chamberlain wrote: Whatever may prove to be the nature of the German–Soviet Agreement, it cannot alter Great Britain's obligation to Poland which His Majesty's Government have stated in public repeatedly and plainly and which they are determined to fulfill.
Hore-Belisha's high public profile and reputation as a radical reformer, who was turning the army into a modern fighting force, made him attractive to many, but he and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Lord Gort, soon lost confidence in each other in strategic matters.
At first, Chamberlain believed that it was best for him to remain in office for the duration of the crisis, but opposition to his continued premiership was such that at a meeting of the War Cabinet, Lord Privy Seal Sir Kingsley Wood told him clearly that it was time to form an all-party government.
Later that day he stood outside Number 10 Downing Street and again read from the document and concluded:the settlement of the Czechoslovakian problem, which has now been achieved is, in my view, only the prelude to a larger settlement in which all Europe may find peace. This morning I had another talk with the German Chancellor, Herr Hitler, and here is the paper which bears his name upon it as well as mine (waves paper to the crowd – receiving loud cheers and "Hear Hears") . Some of you, perhaps, have already heard what it contains but I would just like to read it to you
My good friends, for the second time in our history, a British Prime Minister has returned from Germany bringing peace with honour. I believe it is peace for our time .
