[2] The tactical, technological, and training differences between the two sides ensured the British suffered a casualty rate nearly four times as great as their opponents.

The RFC's commanding officer, Hugh Trenchard believed in the offensive use of air power and pushed for operations over German-controlled territory.

Crucially, British pilot training was not only poorly organised and inconsistent, it had to be drastically abbreviated to keep squadrons suffering heavy casualties up to strength.

After the heavy losses and failures against the French over Verdun in 1916 and against the British at the Somme, they had reorganised their air forces into the Luftstreitkräfte by October 1916, which now included Jastas, specialist fighter units.

Paradoxically, the one sided nature of the casualty lists during Bloody April was partly a result of German numerical inferiority.

In support of the British army, the RFC deployed 25 squadrons, totalling 365 aircraft, about one-third of which were fighters (or "scouts" as they were called at the time).

48 Squadron during April, but lost heavily on its first patrol, with four out of six shot down in an encounter with five Albatros D.IIIs of Jasta 11, led by Manfred von Richthofen (popularly known as the Red Baron).

The RFC continued to support the army throughout the Arras offensive with up-to-date aerial photographs, reconnaissance information, effective contact patrolling during British advances and harassing bombing raids.

Within a couple of months the new technologically advanced generation of fighter (the SE.5, Sopwith Camel, and SPAD S.XIII) had entered service in numbers and quickly gained ascendancy over the over-worked Jastas.