Having repulsed the counteroffensive of the Austro-Hungarian troops in late December 1914 - early January 1915, the Russian armies of the left flank of the Southwestern Front (8th and 11th) went on the offensive and again reached the Beskids, part of the passes of the main Carpathian ridge and captured almost throughout Bukovina.
But the commander-in-chief of the armies of the Southwestern Front, General of Artillery N. Ivanov and his chief of staff, General of Infantry Mikhail Alekseyev, proposed to shift the direction of the main attack to the Carpathians, overcome the mountain barrier and reach the Hungarian Plain, which would open the way to Budapest and Vienna, and consequently led to the withdrawal of Austria-Hungary from the war.
Yuri Danilov believed that the active army would be ready for a major offensive only by April 1915, since it was then that the training of the 1915 call-up and the replenishment of artillery shells were expected to be completed.
[18] However, M. Alekseyev, who was absent at the meeting, in his report on January 20, emphasized that the Austro-Hungarian troops should not be neglected, they are replenished much faster and receive help from Germany, so we should expect their new offensive from the Carpathians as early as mid-January.
He proposed to strengthen the armies of the South-Western Front, but for now there is a concentration of troops for the main attack on Germany, to strike at Austria-Hungary in order to push its troops back from Przemysl, to take a more advantageous line outside the Carpathian Mountains, to bring the cavalry into operational space and create threat to Krakow from the southeast.
The actions of the troops were subordinated to the main goal - the greatest weakening of Germany by a blow to the weakest link, as the Russian Headquarters believed.
[22][23] According to Prit Buttar, "The rugged peaks and passes of the Carpathians formed a natural barrier between Galicia, now in Russian hands, and the great plain of Hungary and the Danube valley.
Russian forces consisted of Aleksei Brusilov's 8th Army, with the XXIV, XII, and VII Corps, reinforced by the XXII by the end of January.
This prompted Conrad to try and advance past the Russian lines along the Carpathians once again, ordering Eduard von Böhm-Ermolli's Second Army to reach Przemyśl by March 12.
However, the Russians transferred their Ninth Army to that sector, and by early March, Stavka placed increased emphasis on a southern campaign.
With Conrad's front line in danger of retreat, Georg von der Marwitz's Beskidenkorps counterattacked, forcing the Russians to be driven back and their Eighth and Ninth Armies put on the defensive.
[30] During the fighting in the Carpathians from January to the end of April, the Russian armies of the Southwestern Front, according to the reports of the headquarters, taking into account the surrender of Przemyśl, captured 9 generals, 4,726 officers, 251,008 soldiers (of which 16 officers and 813 soldiers of the German army) , 600 in fortresses (mostly out of order) and 48 field guns, 363 machine guns, 2 mortars and 2 aircraft, many other military equipment and ammunition.
On March 5, confirmation came from the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander General of Infantry Nikolai Yanushkevich: “The Jewish population, without distinction of sex and age, in the combat area should be evicted towards the enemy.
On March 27, Yanushkevich telegraphed to the headquarters of the fronts: “Information is coming from the Minister of the Interior about the attempted eviction of the Jews from Galicia deep into Russia.
On April 7, the demand for the strict implementation of these repressive measures was confirmed by the chief supply officer of the armies of the Southwestern Front, Infantry General A. Mavrin [ru].
On February 12, 1915, the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander, Infantry General N. Yanushkevich, accused soldiers from the German colonists of "unreliability" and ordered them to be sent to the Caucasian front (with the exception of militias and non-combatants).