These increasingly complex webs of economic interdependence undermine state power and elevate the influence of transnational non-state actors.
[5] The term "complex interdependence" was claimed by Raymond Leslie Buell in 1925 to describe the new ordering among economies, cultures, and races.
[7][2] The theorists recognized that the various and complex transnational connections and interdependencies between states and societies increased, while Military force and power balancing are decreasing but remain essential.
With the rise of neoliberal economics, debates, and the need to clarify international relations theory, Keohane has most recently described himself as merely an institutionalist.
[8] Multiple channels that are present in complex interdependence are "connect societies, including informal ties between governmental elites as well as formal foreign office arrangements."
These implications have encouraged consulting agreements among countries through liberal institutions like the IMF and the European Community.
[12] One concern that stems from the diminishing role of military force is that Terrorism may be used more frequently, since most states are less likely to commit troops overseas.
Neoliberals believe that these institutions provide states with absolute gains from complex interdependence while neglecting the idea of power.
[13] Economic gains through trade and foreign investments negate any power struggles among states, addressed by liberal theorists.
[13] Acting outside the complex relationships in means of isolating domestic economies or wars would, in turn, destabilize peace among states, disrupting world order.
[13] In the concept of weaponized interdependence (see section below), liberal scholars Keohane and Nye suggest that network asymmetries will decrease over time.
[12] The idea often pushes back against classical realist logic, such as the interdependent relationship between Canada and the United States.
Keohane and Nye see complex interdependence as often a more accurate representation of reality than classical realism but claim that most situations fall in between the two ideal portraits.
It is understood that traditional theories cannot explain global regime change when it relates to complex interdependence.
Yet, the realist take on power can be displayed through the economic imbalance experienced among states to inflict their influence through complex interdependence.
[14] Unlike Keohane and Nye, they believe that networks are the opposite of fragmented, and they instead produce lasting power inequality, where exchanges only go through a few chief nodes.
[14] In this context, panopticon means that states have information they can use to their advantage in order to predict their opponent's actions, sway negotiations, etc.
We see the chokepoint effect when the U.S (and European officials) locked Iran out of the global payment system because they felt it was assisting the regime and a contributor to its financial strength.
[14] An example of the panopticon effect was the U.S' use of SWIFT, shortly after 9/11, in order to gain information about international terrorism, its networks, and its financing.
[14] Therefore, just as the theory suggests, because SWIFT was a chief node in the global network system, certain states were able to weaponize it for strategic reasons.