be a set of closed sentences (informally "axioms") and
the set of closed sentences provable from
under some (specified, possibly implicitly) formal deductive system.
Conversely, in an explosive formal system (e.g., classical or intuitionistic propositional or first-order logics) every inconsistent theory is trivial.
[2]: 7 Consistency of a theory is a syntactic notion, whose semantic counterpart is satisfiability.
A theory is satisfiable if it has a model, i.e., there exists an interpretation under which all axioms in the theory are true.
[3] This is what consistent meant in traditional Aristotelian logic, although in contemporary mathematical logic the term satisfiable is used instead.
In a sound formal system, every satisfiable theory is consistent, but the converse does not hold.
If there exists a deductive system for which these semantic and syntactic definitions are equivalent for any theory formulated in a particular deductive logic, the logic is called complete.
[citation needed] The completeness of the propositional calculus was proved by Paul Bernays in 1918[citation needed][4] and Emil Post in 1921,[5] while the completeness of (first order) predicate calculus was proved by Kurt Gödel in 1930,[6] and consistency proofs for arithmetics restricted with respect to the induction axiom schema were proved by Ackermann (1924), von Neumann (1927) and Herbrand (1931).
[8] The early development of mathematical proof theory was driven by the desire to provide finitary consistency proofs for all of mathematics as part of Hilbert's program.
Hilbert's program was strongly impacted by the incompleteness theorems, which showed that sufficiently strong proof theories cannot prove their consistency (provided that they are consistent).
Although consistency can be proved using model theory, it is often done in a purely syntactical way, without any need to reference some model of the logic.
The cut-elimination (or equivalently the normalization of the underlying calculus if there is one) implies the consistency of the calculus: since there is no cut-free proof of falsity, there is no contradiction in general.
In theories of arithmetic, such as Peano arithmetic, there is an intricate relationship between the consistency of the theory and its completeness.
A theory is complete if, for every formula φ in its language, at least one of φ or ¬φ is a logical consequence of the theory.
Presburger arithmetic is an axiom system for the natural numbers under addition.
Gödel's incompleteness theorems show that any sufficiently strong recursively enumerable theory of arithmetic cannot be both complete and consistent.
Gödel's theorem applies to the theories of Peano arithmetic (PA) and primitive recursive arithmetic (PRA), but not to Presburger arithmetic.
Moreover, Gödel's second incompleteness theorem shows that the consistency of sufficiently strong recursively enumerable theories of arithmetic can be tested in a particular way.
Such a theory is consistent if and only if it does not prove a particular sentence, called the Gödel sentence of the theory, which is a formalized statement of the claim that the theory is indeed consistent.
Thus the consistency of a sufficiently strong, recursively enumerable, consistent theory of arithmetic can never be proven in that system itself.
The same result is true for recursively enumerable theories that can describe a strong enough fragment of arithmetic—including set theories such as Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory (ZF).
These set theories cannot prove their own Gödel sentence—provided that they are consistent, which is generally believed.
Because consistency of ZF is not provable in ZF, the weaker notion relative consistency is interesting in set theory (and in other sufficiently expressive axiomatic systems).
If both A and ¬A are consistent with T, then A is said to be independent of T. In the following context of mathematical logic, the turnstile symbol
reads: b is provable from a (in some specified formal system).
denote the equivalence class of terms containing
is an equivalence relation and also requires a proof that (1) and (2) are independent of the choice of
A consistent theory is one such that the following logically equivalent conditions hold