The concept stems from the Diversionary War Theory, which states that leaders who are threatened by domestic turmoil may initiate an international conflict in order to improve their standing.
There are two primary mechanisms behind diversionary war: a manipulation of the rally 'round the flag effect, causing an increase of national fervor from the general public,[1] and "gambling for resurrection", whereby a leader in a perilous domestic situation takes high-risk foreign policy decisions with a small chance of success but with a high reward if successful.
A large percentage investigates Presidents of the United States and their disputed culpability for partaking in diversionary foreign policy.
[3] Despite the immense amount of effort and research, scholars have not yet formed a consensus on the accuracy of the theory, and empirical evidence is mixed at best.
The theory itself states that rational leaders facing a near inevitable removal from office become more likely to gamble on a risky diversionary war.
[6] Although the theory was not officially addressed in academia until the past half-century, the benefits of a diversionary foreign policy had long been accepted by governments and others as conventional wisdom.
[7] A significant number of studies have attempted to establish connections between the instigation of war as a way to divert attention from a struggling economy, or general low approval ratings.
Sir John Keegan has opined that the primary motivation for Henry's decision to invade France (ostensibly asserting, "on dubious legal grounds", a claim to the succession of the French throne), was to solidify his popularity at home and quell unrest from other English nobles, several of whom questioned the legitimacy of his dynasty, since his father, Henry IV, had usurped the throne from Richard II.
[11] In 1792, the French Government comprised a newly formed National Assembly, which had replaced King Louis XVI.
[13][14][15] Rachel Eva Schley states that in 1827, Minister of War Aimé-Marie-Gaspard de Clermont-Tonnerre believed that "a political and military distraction was imperative" to boost the king's international stature, and to divert attention away "from troubles at home.
Bismarck used the success of the 1870–1871 Franco-Prussian War in a similar fashion, officially establishing a German Empire following the siege of Paris.
It has been argued that, as a way to distract their population, the Russian Tzar and his ministers decided to goad the Japanese into declaring war, thereby turning Japan into the needed out-group.
Clearly, at least some of the Russians in power at the time believed that by a diversionary war, they would be able to distract their population from the domestic troubles that had been haunting Russia.
However, there is some evidence that the Tsar himself, and some of his advisors, did not believe that, being viewed as overmatched, Japan would be willing to go to war, and intended to use only the threat of such a conflict as a diversionary tactic.
Diversionary foreign policy is supported by anecdotal evidence because it is hard to prove a theory in international relations quantitatively.
To begin with, there is an opposing theory that argues a state leader has the most leverage when citizens are content with domestic policy and he has high public approval ratings.
[9] Furthermore, some analysts argue that the entire basis for the argument, the idea that a foreign enemy brings a country together, is not as well founded as it originally seems.