Great Naktong Offensive
The KPA subsequently planned a simultaneous offensive for their entire army along five axes of the perimeter; and on September 1 intense fighting erupted around the cities of Masan, Kyongju, Taegu, Yongch'on and the Naktong Bulge.
[4] Fed with intelligence from the Soviet Union the North Koreans were aware that the UN forces were building up along the Pusan Perimeter and that it must conduct an offensive soon or it could not win the battle.
The US 21st Infantry Regiment was moving to a position north of Taegu on the morning of August 27, when Walker revoked its orders and instructed it to turn around and proceed as rapidly as possible to Kyongju and report to Coulter.
[33] That day, August 28, Walker issued a special statement addressed to the ROK, and meant also for the South Korean Minister of Defense, Shin Sung-mo.
Also on August 29, the ROK Capital Division, with American tank and artillery support, recaptured Kigye and held it during the night against KPA counterattacks, only to lose it again at dawn.
Faced with this big gap on his left flank, Coulter put the US 21st Infantry in the broad valley and on its bordering hills northwest of Kyongju to block any approach from that direction.
After the ROK 5th and 11th Regiments arrived in the vicinity of Yongch'on to reinforce the demoralized 8th Division, the fighting was so intense that the two armies had no chance to regroup for co-ordinating action.
The part played by KMAG officers in rounding up stragglers of the ROK 8th Division and in reorganizing its units was an important factor in the successful outcome of these battles.
But Walker's quick dispatch of the ROK 5th and 11th Regiments from two widely separated sectors of the front to the area of penetration resulted in destroying the force before it could exploit its breakthrough.
During the night of September 7/8 the 5th Cavalry Regiment on division orders withdrew still farther below Waegwan to new defensive positions astride the main Seoul-Taegu highway.
The KPA struck the 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, the night of September 2/3 on Hill 448 west of the Bowling Alley and 2 miles (3.2 km) north of Tabu-dong, and overran it.
[56] During the day, elements of the KPA 1st Division forced the 8th Cavalry I&R Platoon and a detachment of National Police from the Walled City of Ka-san on the crest of Hill 902, 4 miles (6.4 km) east of Tabu-dong.
[63][64] The next morning, September 4, the force moved to Ka-san[50] and set up an assembly area near the village of Kisong-dong 2 miles (3.2 km) east of the Tabu-dong road.
[25][69][71] Even though the 1st Cavalry Division fell back nearly everywhere on September 7, Walker ordered it and ROK II Corps to attack and seize Hill 902 and Ka-san.
[69][71] On the morning of September 8, an estimated 1,000 KPA soldiers were on Hill 570, 8 miles (13 km) north of Taegu, and Walker decided the continued pressure against the eastern flank of the 1st Cavalry Division sector was the most immediate threat to the UN forces at Pusan Perimeter.
[81] During the last week of August, US troops on these hills could see minor KPA activity across the river, which they thought were North Koreans organizing the high ground on the west side of the Naktong against a possible US attack.
Its mission in the forthcoming attack was to outflank and destroy the US troops at Naktong Bulge by capturing the Miryang and Samnangjin areas to cut off the US 2nd Division's route of supply and withdrawal between Taegu and Pusan.
[83] From 21:30 until shortly after midnight the KPA 9th Division crossed the Naktong at a number of places and climbed the hills quietly toward the 9th Infantry river line positions.
[88] This force was unable to reach C Company, but Lieutenant Colonel Carl C. Jensen collected stragglers from it and seized high ground astride this main approach to Changnyong near Ponch'o-ri above Lake Sanorho, and went into a defensive position there.
[89] Keiser hoped he could organize a defense along the Changnyong-Yongsan road east of the Naktong River, and prevent KPA access to the passes eastward leading to Miryang and Ch'ongdo.
[98] On the morning of September 1 the 1st and 2nd Regiments of the KPA 9th Division, in their first offensive of the war, stood only a few miles short of Yongsan after a river crossing and penetration of the US line.
[31][99] The 3rd Regiment had been left at Inch'on, but division commander Major General Pak Kyo Sam felt the chances of capturing Yongsan were strong.
[111] Air strikes, artillery concentrations, and machine gun and rifle fire of the 1st Battalion now caught KPA reinforcements in open rice paddies moving up from the second ridge and killed most of them.
[116] As the attack progressed, the Marines approached Obong-ni Ridge and the 9th Infantry neared Cloverleaf Hill where they had fought tenaciously during the First Battle of Naktong Bulge the month before.
[115] Assault teams of B Company and the 1st Battalion with 3.5-inch rocket launchers rushed into action, took the tanks under fire, and destroyed both of them, as well as an armored personnel carrier following behind.
[130] Other KPA soldiers crossed the Nam on an underwater bridge in front of the paddy ground north of Komam-ni and near the boundary between the 2nd Battalion, led by Lieutenant Colonel John L. Wilkins, Jr., holding the river front and Lieutenant Colonel Bernard G. Teeter's 1st Battalion holding the hill line that stretched from the Nam River to Sibidang-san and the Chinju-Masan highway.
[131] In the low ground between these two battalions at the river ferry crossing site, Lieutenant Colonel Henry Fisher had placed 300 ROK National Police, expecting them to hold there long enough to serve as a warning for the rest of the forces.
But the KPA did not drive for the Komam-ni road fork 4 miles (6.4 km) south of the river as Fisher expected them to; instead, they turned east into the hills behind 2nd Battalion.
Tanks and armored cars drove to the isolated units with supplies of food and ammunition and carried back critically wounded on the return trips.
[139] With virtually no equipment, exhausted manpower and low morale, the KPA were at a severe disadvantage and would not be able to continue pressure on the Pusan Perimeter while attempting to repel the landings at Inchon.
