Greater Indonesia
[1] It was espoused by students and graduates of Sultan Idris Training College for Malay Teachers in the late 1920s, and individuals from Sumatra and Java, including Mohammad Natsir and Sukarno, on 28 September 1950.
A recurring theme that has imposed itself on the historiography of the Indo-Malay Archipelago has been conflict born of the apprehension of peoples in the region concerning Javanese domination.
[3] The Pan-Malay union was based on understandings on similarities in race, shared language, religion and culture among ethnic groups in Maritime Southeast Asia.
At the end of the 1920s, the idea to form a new independent nation grew among the people of Dutch East Indies, especially among educated pribumi (native Indonesian).
[7] The Malay nationalist Kesatuan Melayu Muda group, founded in 1938 by Ibrahim Yaacob, was one of the more notable entities that embraced the concept as part of its goals.
It was in this short conference that Sukarno, flanked by Hatta, shook hands with Ibrahim Yaacob and said, 'Let us form one single Motherland for all the sons of Indonesia'.
[17] In Indonesia, where the possibility of a political unit extending across both the Dutch and British Archipelago was considered briefly, and then rejected, the ‘Malay’ idea was simply not a powerful one.
[3] The rulers (royal courts and kerajaan) were accused of collaborating with the Dutch – who were fighting to regain control of their empire from Sukarno and the Republic – and were also condemned as being “antiquated” and “smelling” of feudalism.
Sukarno strongly opposed the British decolonisation initiative involving the formation of the Federation of Malaysia that would comprise the Malay Peninsula and North Borneo.
That hostile political stance led to the Indonesia–Malaysia Confrontation in the early 1960s that was manifested in an undeclared war with small scale trans-border battles and military infiltration in Borneo.
Sukarno accused the new nation of Malaysia of being a British puppet state aimed at establishing neo-imperialism and neo-colonialism in Southeast Asia, and also at containing Indonesian ambition to be the regional hegemonic power.
The campaign against the Malayan Union – portrayed as a common threat to ‘Malays’ right across the Peninsula – was also a time when the bangsa Melayu concept was much strengthened.
They were a complete contrast to the old kerajaan equation in which subjects were understood to be virtually embodied in ‘the raja’ – defined with reference to him, and living in accordance with the adat (custom) that was conceived as being ‘in his hands’.
[3] In 1961 Tunku Abdul Rahman led an attempt to expand the Malayan federation, hoping to incorporate Singapore, Crown Colony of Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei – all the territories formerly under British administration of one form or another.
[3] To convince both these provinces to agree to join ‘Malaysia’, compromises were made by the Peninsula leaders to placate the ‘non-Malay’ peoples, suspicious of ‘Malay colonialism’.
But there was also concern about leaving Singapore independent (especially considering the largely ‘Chinese’ communist movement on the Peninsula), and, after all, the inclusion of the Borneo territories was expected to counter to some extent the ‘Singapore-Chinese’ impact.
[3] In Thailand the incorporation of the kerajaan polities, as we have seen, has been a long and sometimes unpleasant process – and, unlike the case of the British and Dutch, Thai colonial rule (as some in the ‘Malay’ community would describe it) has not been withdrawn.
[20] After the Indonesia-Malaysia peace deal, Indonesia was occupied with its own domestic problems building its economy while trying to maintain its unity as a diverse and plural nation.
[21] As the largest nation in Southeast Asia, Indonesia seems to be satisfied on channelling its regional ambition through assuming leadership role among ASEAN countries.
The national unity issues in Malaysia have also been aggravated with inter-racial tensions, especially between the Malay majority with Chinese and Indian minorities, the main problem that has influenced Malaysian politics up until now.
By the end of the 1960s, UMNO gained domination in Malaysian politics, while their rival, the advocate of the republic and the union with Greater Indonesia, were stigmatised as leftists, communists or even traitors.
In North Borneo, the Brunei royals chose not to follow Sarawak and Sabah in forming Malaysia and remained under British protection until 1984.
[23] Ismail Sabri Yaakob said Malaysia and Indonesia will continue to make efforts to uplift the status of Bahasa Melayu, which may become an ASEAN language one day.
[26] Kornelius Purba, the editor of The Jakarta Post, commented that the Malaysian leader wanted to leave a quick legacy, the Minister Nadiem Makarim was blunter in rejecting idea, and could spark unnecessary suspicion from predominantly Buddhist nations such as Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, or from the predominantly Catholic Philippines.
[27] Joanne Lin, a researcher in ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, commented that this idea will likely be viewed as another nationalistic endeavour by Kuala Lumpur or even Ismail Sabri himself to score points on the domestic front, but possibly erode efforts to preserve regional stability and order, and might open the way for a proliferation of similar requests to pour through the floodgates.
