On 23 August 2000 at 19:30 Arabia Standard Time (UTC+3), the Airbus A320 crashed minutes after executing a go-around upon failed attempt to land on Runway 12.

The flight crew suffered from spatial disorientation during the go-around and crashed into the shallow waters of the Persian Gulf 2 km (1 nmi) from the airport.

A number of systemic factors were also contributed to the accident, including deficiency in crew resource management (CRM) training by Gulf Air and safety oversights by the Directorate General Of Civil Aviation and Meteorology of Oman.

After fuming for realizing this, they finally succeeded in arriving at the correct gate approximately more than 50 minutes late of the scheduled takeoff time.

Flight 072 departed from Cairo at 16:52 local time with 135 passengers and 8 crews on board, with Captain Shakeeb as the pilot flying and First Officer al-Alawi as pilot-not-flying.

[1]: 4, 67–68 At 19:30 p.m., flying with a speed of 280 knots and a nose-down pitch of 6.5 degrees, the aircraft slammed onto the sea below, instantly killing all 143 passengers and crew members.

US Navy support ship USNS Catawba was deployed with dive team, meanwhile the USS George Washington, which was docked in Manama at the time, sent 100 of its personnel to join the operation.

Dozens of ambulances were dispatched and the bodies of the victims were transported to Salmaniya Hospital, the nation's largest medical centre.

As several relatives began to cry in hysterics after several names had been read out, ambulances were put on standby, and medics were handed tranquillizers for the bereaved.

The funeral also drew thousands of Bahrainis[7][28] In Egypt, officials stated that the government would provide every need for the relatives, particularly regarding repatriation and compensation.

Bahrain's Undersecretary for Civil Aviation, Ibrahim al-Hamer, stated that it was "premature" to express their opinion on the crash, though he added that it was the responsibility of the pilot to land their aircraft safely.

[43][44] Accounts from eyewitnesses suggested that the aircraft had circled the airport multiple times whilst it was trying to land and at one point was seen trying to swerve around the buildings in Manama.

While nearing the airport, Captain Shakeeb suddenly told First Officer al-Alawi that they were going to switch from IFR to VFR, which was not relayed to the ATC.

As the autopilot and flight directors were turned off, Captain Shakeeb noticed that the remaining time and distance for a safe and stabilized approach were insufficient.

[1]: 3, 63–71 During the orbit, Captain Shakeeb could not fly the aircraft smoothly as the extended flaps and landing gear inflicted significant drag.

As the aircraft was turning away from Manama, the overspeed alarm suddenly blared, warning the crew that their excessive airspeed could tear the flaps.

The FDR at this point recorded that Captain Shakeeb made a large nose-down input, causing the aircraft to pitch down at the maximum allowable angle of 15 degrees.

Study and simulator trial from the accident revealed that, had Captain Shakeeb pulled the nose up within two seconds of the first GPWS warning, the aircraft wouldn't have crashed.

As the aircraft headed towards the Gulf Sea in the north of the airport, where lights barely existed due to no buildings ahead, added with the fact that the stars and moon at the time were partially obscured by light haze and that there were barely any ships within their direction, the crew couldn't spot the horizon line that separated the sea and the sky.

[1]: E1–E8 Analysis from the FDR confirmed that the pilots might have been inflicted by forces significant enough to cause them to think that the aircraft was pitching up, which was largely contributed by the shallow climb angle and rapid acceleration.

[1]: E1–E8 With not a single light that could be seen outside of the cockpit window, disabled flight directors, and no identifiable features of the horizon, the pilots relied on their vestibular somatosensory system and believed that the aircraft was pitching up with a large angle.

As he attempted the go-around, he was still managing multiple things, including running through the landing checklist, reconfiguring the aircraft, and handling the question from First Officer al-Alawi regarding their contact with the ATC, before the flaps overspeed alarm suddenly appeared.

Despite multiple alarms, he continued to make the nose down input as he had been fixated with the flaps overspeed problem, which was displayed on the electronic centralised aircraft monitor (ECAM).

At one point, a first officer who had flown with him had challenged Shakeeb on his decision to leave the engine anti-ice on even though they were cleared of flying from icing conditions.

Increasingly stressful conditions in the cockpit caused both pilots to fixate on the flaps overspeed problem, overlooking the high rate of descent that had been made by Captain Shakeeb.

Among the deficiencies included in the review were problems with CRM, quality management, safety awareness, surface contamination, and crew records.

Violations and non-compliances were also found in flight operations and unapproved changes to existing programs[1]: 51–53 In response to Gulf Air's failures to comply with the issued warnings, Omani authorities asked assistance from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) for further evaluation.

According to investigators, Gulf Air's decision to not attend the conventions would have greatly restricted the airline's awareness of new information and developments regarding the latest issues in aviation safety.

The accident investigation concluded that the primary cause of the crash was pilot error (including spatial disorientation), with a secondary factor being systemic organizational and oversight issues.

[1]: 54–56 After the crash, Gulf Air established its first flight-data analysis system, which would enable them to monitor pilots' compliance with the company's standard operating procedure.