On 30 January 2000, the Airbus A310-300 serving the flight crashed into the sea off the Ivory Coast, shortly after takeoff from Félix-Houphouët-Boigny International Airport, Abidjan.

The investigation concluded that the crash was caused by the flight crew's improper response following the activation of a false stall warning.

In the aftermath of the crash, the BEA issued recommendations for better training for pilots in terms of handling a false stall warning.

[7] On that day, after being held over Lagos, the flight continued directly to Abidjan because of poor local weather conditions.

Just seconds after takeoff, at the moment when the first officer requested the landing gear to be retracted, the stall warning sounded in the cockpit.

The aircraft crashed into the Atlantic Ocean, 2 kilometres (1.2 mi; 1.1 nmi) east of the airport, off the Ivory Coast.

The airline set up a crisis centre at the InterContinental Hotel in Nairobi,[9][12] while pleasure boats and tugboats assisted in the search and rescue operation.

[13][2]: 161–162 At midnight on 31 January, one of the pleasure boats reported a strong odor from kerosene in the area, east from the runway extended centre line.

A French passenger managed to swim for 2 km (1.2 mi) to the shore before finally being found by authorities.

[12][14][15][2]: 39–40 The search and rescue continued until the noon of 31 January, after authorities reported "no chance of finding any more people".

Forty-three of the deceased received first-degree burns due to contact with the jet fuel spilled in the water.

[2]: 36–37 The Bureau of Enquiry and Analysis for Civil Aviation Safety (BEA), the accident investigation authority of France, assisted in the search for the flight recorders.

According to investigators, several debris, including half of the aircraft's main landing gear and the fin, had been recovered on beaches nearby.

[2]: 35–36, 41 Several scenarios may have caused the activation of the aircraft's stall warning aboard Flight 431, including an incorrect configuration on take-off, an incorrect speed indication, a loss of engines thrust, an uncommanded slats retraction, a shift of the aircraft's center of gravity, or an uncommanded deployment of the thrust reversers and spoilers, all of which were ruled out due to a lack of evidence.

A damaged angle of attack sensor and an erroneous calculation on the speed could also produce a false stall warning.

[2]: 67 The described procedure in Airbus' Flight Crew Operation Manual (FCOM) stated that in case of the presence of a stall warning with the activation of the stick shaker, flight crew should immediately and simultaneously apply full maximum engine thrust and reduction on the aircraft's pitch attitude and it should remain in that position until the stick shaker stops.

[2]: 67 On the accident flight, First Officer Mulli (the pilot flying) immediately applied the supposed recovery procedure as soon as the stall warning appeared.

The aural stall warning combined with the activation of the stick shaker would make the First Officer maintain his action.

[2]: 68 Investigators concluded that First Officer Mulli's action was caused by several reasons; the unexpected type of warning (in this case a stall warning) during the phase of the flight, the aural warning and the stick shaker activation combined with the lack of visual reference on board as the flight took off towards the sea in night time condition, and the continued activation of the stick shaker despite his actions.

[1] The investigation concluded the cause of the crash as follows: The Commission of Inquiry concluded that the cause of the accident to flight KQ 431 on 30 January 2000 was a collision with the sea that resulted from the pilot flying applying one part of the procedure, by pushing forward on the control column to stop the stick shaker, following the initiation of a stall warning on rotation, while the airplane was not in a true stall situation.

The following elements contributed to the accident: In the aftermath of the crash, the investigation team recommended civil aviation authorities to ask operators and training organizations under their authority to include trainings on recognizing false stall alarm during phases of flight close to the ground.

During the course of the investigation, the team also learnt on new stall recovery procedure from Airbus, where flight crew should have minimized loss of altitude by applying maximum thrust and use optimal pitch.

[23] The lack of maritime equipment, gaps in communication, and inclement weather and situation in the crash site contributed to the difficulty of the rescue operation.

The commission recommended civil authorities in coastal airports to ensure the availability of appropriate equipment to ease the search and rescue efforts.