Libya had claimed that the entire Gulf was their territory, at 32° 30′ N, with an exclusive 62-nautical-mile (115 km; 71 mi) fishing zone, which Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi asserted as "The Line of Death" in 1973.

[2][3][4] This prompted the United States to conduct Freedom of Navigation (FON) operations in the area since the claim did not meet the criteria established by international law.

[5][6] Libya often confronted U.S. forces in and near the gulf, and on two occasions its fighter jets opened fire on U.S. reconnaissance flights off the Libyan coast; once in early 1973[3][7][8][9][10] and again in late 1980.

[14][15] Early in the morning of 18 August, when the U.S. exercise began, at least three MiG-25 "Foxbats" approached the U.S. carrier groups and were escorted away by American interceptors.

[17] On the morning of 19 August, after having diverted a number of Libyan "mock" attacks on the battle group the previous day, two F-14s from VF-41 "Black Aces",[18] Fast Eagle 102 (CDR Henry 'Hank' Kleemann/LT David 'DJ' Venlet) (flying BuNo 160403)[19] and Fast Eagle 107 (LT Lawrence 'Music' Muczynski/LTJG James 'Luca'[20] Anderson) (in BuNo 160390),[19] were flying a combat air patrol (CAP), ostensibly to cover aircraft engaged in a missile exercise.

[21] However, U.S. Navy Commander Thompson S. Sanders wrote in Air & Space/Smithsonian that his S-3A Viking's mission was the real precursor to this incident.

Sanders was ordered to fly his Viking in a "racetrack" orbit (oval pattern) inside Gaddafi's claimed zone but outside the internationally recognized 12-mile (19 km) territorial water limit to try to provoke the Libyans to react.

[21][22][26] The Tomcats evaded the missile and were cleared to return fire by their rules of engagement, which mandated self-defense on the initiation of hostile action.