On 6 January 1968, a low-loader transporter carrying a 120-ton electrical transformer was struck by a British Rail express train on a recently installed automatic level crossing at Hixon, Staffordshire, England.

In the 1950s, British Railways found that the cost of manning 2,400 level crossings had risen past £1 million per annum, with some locations seeing a tenfold increase.

In addition, manually operated crossings often caused long delays to road traffic because of the need to close the gates and clear the distant signal before the approaching train reached it.

[2] In October 1956, senior members of Her Majesty's Railway Inspectorate (HMRI) embarked on a fact-finding trip to the Netherlands, Belgium and France, to investigate the practice of automating level crossings.

The airfield was on Station Road, adjacent to the Manchester branch of the West Coast Main Line and approximately three miles (5 km) north of Colwich Junction.

The journey was not an unusual procedure as six other abnormal loads belonging to the English Electric Company had passed over the automatic crossing in the preceding months.

[4] At 12:26, the leading tractor had traversed the two railway tracks and the main bulk of the transporter was astride them when the 11:30 express train from Manchester to London Euston activated the crossing sequence by operating a treadle 1,000 yards (910 m) away.

At about the same time Groves, who had not heard the bells and could not see the lights, saw the train approaching from his left and, realising that it would not stop, shouted a warning to his crew.

The relatively small number of casualties was due to the sturdy steel construction of the coaches and the first class carriages at the front being only lightly occupied.

The three railwaymen were all in the cab of the locomotive but the second class coaches were filled to capacity, with standing room only, after a large number of sixth form students boarded after a conference at Keele University.

Wynn's had pointed out their concern at the short warning time given in a letter to British Railways, but received a terse reply from the assistant general manager of the Western Region, and therefore did not press the matter further.

They had both been posted to traffic duties in the Stone Division five days earlier and they were unaware of the presence of a main railway line.

"[4] Leaflets had been distributed to local police stations when the crossing was automated the previous July, although they were only on display for the public to pick up.

[4] Both British Rail and the Ministry of Transport also received criticism for their lack of foresight and failure to adequately point out that drivers of slow or heavy loads were required to use the telephone provided before crossing the line.

[7] Marshalled behind the Restaurant Kitchen Buffet car, they derailed, coming to rest alongside the wrecked transformer, receiving light damage.

Likewise, Fraser Pithie has criticised the role of the HMRI which was 'in the driving seat' with the installation of AHB (automatic half barriers), not BR.