Great Western Trains, whose managing director survived the crash in one of the most badly affected carriages, was fined for failure to ensure that the HST had their automatic warning system working during long journeys.

[1] Earlier that day, the HST's previous driver, James Tunnock, had found a fault with the Automatic Warning System (AWS) that prevented the brakes from releasing.

[2] As the tracks on the Up Main Line straightened ahead of the HST, the driver saw the Hanson-operated Class 59 locomotive 59101 Village of Whatley a mile in the distance, moving "at a funny angle," and realised that it was crossing his path.

The driver of the freight train, Alan Bricker, observed the approaching HST and expected it to stop, but was alarmed by its speed and apparent brake application.

I see the slow train crossing over then"[1]: Annex 08 If the AWS or the ATP equipment on the HST had been working, the chance of the accident occurring would have been highly unlikely.

It emerged after the incident that the reset switch of the warning system had contamination on its electrical contact surfaces which rendered its performance intermittent, hence its disabling at Oxford the day before the crash.

The Rail Safety and Standards Board rulebook was revised to cover this: "Driver.....if you become aware that the AWS has become defective when it is required to be in operation, you must.....tell the signaller"[5]A public inquiry into the incident was formally opened on 24 February 1998, with Professor John Uff appointed to chair by the Health and Safety Commission with the consent of the Secretary of State for Environment, Transport and the Regions.

The rulebook was changed, so that if AWS is isolated the train may only run at high speed with a competent person accompanying the driver in the cab.

"If a competent person is not provided...proceed at a speed not exceeding 40 mph (65 km/h), or any lower permissible speed that may apply, to the location where a competent person is available or to the location where the train can be dealt with"[5]Among survivors in the two most severely stricken coaches in front of the buffet car were Richard George, then managing director of GWT, who played a valuable role in establishing calm, and four injured members of staff in the buffet car, who quickly organised help for passengers.