Hoyos Mission
This secret mission was intended to provide Austro-Hungarian policy-makers with information on the Reich's[nb 1] intentions shortly after the assassination of Franz Ferdinand of Austria, the Imperial and Royal Kronprinz, in Sarajevo.
On 5 July 1914, a week after the assassination attempt that claimed the lives of the heir to the throne and his wife, the Austro-Hungarian government sought to officially secure the Reich's support for the actions it wished to take against Serbia in response to the attack.
Immediately after the assassination on the imperial and royal heir Franz Ferdinand, the leading Austro-Hungarian officials, initially indecisive, held intensive discussions to determine the political response.
According to the close advisors of Leopold Berchtold, then Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, this attempt to steer international relations in a direction once again favorable to the dual monarchy was to be the result of swift action.
Similarly, Arthur Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, called for moderation through László Szőgyény-Marich Jr., the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Berlin, as he did not wish to see Vienna impose humiliating conditions on Belgrade.
In this way, Reich officials called into question the advice they had previously given to their Austro-Hungarian counterparts: indeed, until late 1913, German diplomats advised their interlocutors in the dual monarchy to conciliate Serbian leaders by means of bribes or bilateral cooperation programs.
Wilhelm II adopted these bellicose positions, mainly in the remarks he made on the reports of his ministers and their subordinates, expressing his hostility to Heinrich von Tschirschky's moderation as early as June 30th, and his desire to "annihilate Serbia" on July 2nd.
[13][14] Faced with this situation, the German and Austro-Hungarian allies wished to coordinate their actions, resume a policy of indirect control of the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire, and show unity in their response to the attack.
The presence of Wilhelm II at the Kronprinz funeral would have provided an opportunity for a meeting between the two emperors, but the sudden cancellation of his visit forced the two allies to use other means of communication to synchronize their actions.
Finally, the dispatch of one of the minister's closest diplomats was also intended to enable the two monarchs to hold talks, originally planned for the German emperor's visit to the funeral of the assassinated archduke.
Indeed, Franco-Russian policy, embodied by Tsar Nicholas II's visit to Constantza, led Ottokar Czernin, then Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Bucharest, to consider the alliance with Romania a "dead thing".
[20] Following the news of the attack, Austro-Hungarian officials were divided into two groups on the policy to be adopted: while the majority favored action against Serbia, the Hungarian Prime Minister, István Tisza, and those close to him preferred to settle for diplomatic success.
In this letter, Franz Joseph lashed out violently at the Russian policy: Russia's actions, relayed locally by the Serbs, were aimed solely at destroying the dual monarchy, according to the Emperor and King.
Thus, on the basis of these analyses, the leaders of the Dual Monarchy, represented in Berlin by Alexander Hoyos, one of the most hawkish of Berchtold's teams, proposed to isolate and demean the Kingdom of Belgrade for many years to come, while assuring the Reich of their willingness to engage in armed confrontation with Serbia.
[24][27][30][31] Alongside these official meetings, the Austro-Hungarian representative met Viktor Naumann, a publicist, and confidant of the Reich Foreign Minister and Bavarian Council President Georg von Hertling.
This decision was first taken by Wilhelm II at the luncheon he shared with the two Austro-Hungarian representatives, then confirmed in the afternoon at the informal meeting between the German Emperor, the Reich Chancellor, and the Under-Secretary of State in Potsdam.
[nb 8][30][33] When Alexander Hoyos returned to Vienna on the evening of July 6th, the results of his mission were immediately known, and Austro-Hungarian officials began to discuss the matter, mainly with the aim of convincing Istvan Tisza, then Hungarian Prime Minister, that military action against Serbia was necessary.
