Rapid urbanization and very large quantities of industrial discharge have also caused severe contamination of the water basins that Buenos Aires is built upon.
Argentina enjoyed four years of rapid recovery from the economic and social crisis of 2001-02, which was one of the most severe losses of income and downturns in living standards on record.
Effective macroeconomic management, focused on the generation of primary fiscal surpluses, has helped to sustain this strong performance.
During this time, crime became a serious problem with the creation of an informal criminal economy that sought to take advantage of a lack of economic authority.
Crime rates rose 286% between 1992 and 1995 and in 1995 the former President, Carlos Menem was re-elected with international praise for achieving low inflation, privatizing state-run companies and the currency peg to the dollar.
Crime has continued to grow as a considerable social concern in the aftermath of the 2001 recession and a reversal of the currency peg where hyperinflation ensued.
An estimated 10 percent of the total population in the MR Basin lives in informal settlements, often in flood-prone areas and/or near open garbage dumps.
The poorest populations living alongside the river are in constant contact with numerous contaminants ranging from untreated organic waste to toxic industrial chemicals.
[5] Buenos Aires lies in the pampa region of Argentina and is bordered on the eastern and north-east sides by the Río de la Plata, on the south and southeast side by the Riachuelo and to the northwest, west and Southwest by the Avenida General Paz, which is a long highway that separates the Buenos Aires Province from the city.
Notably, the Maldonado was re-engineered in 1954 to flow underground in tubes and currently runs underneath Juan B. Justo Avenue.
First, the rapid implementation of the Buenos Aires concession contrasted with the slow movement towards private participation in other large urban water systems, such as Santiago or Lima.
Second, the reform was widely acclaimed for generating major improvements in the water and sanitation sectors, including wider coverage, better service, more efficient operation of the company, and a reduction in waste.
Finally, the Buenos Aires case is of interest because the contract was renegotiated in 1997, provoking criticisms of the original bid and the regulation.
[8] The three main watercourses that form the base structure for the region's drainage network are the Luján, Reconquista, and Matanza-Riachuelo Rivers.
Typical dimensions range from 15 m to 20 m wide and 3 m to 4 m high with an internal supporting structure of columns and beams that results in interference of stormwater flow and can cause back up and increased flooding.
In addition to high levels of organic pollution, these discharges contribute toxic contaminants such as heavy metals from petrochemical industries, tanneries, and meat processing facilities.
More specifically, the Riacheuleo has levels of Lead, Zinc and Chrome 50 times higher than the legal limit in Argentina; 25% is from industrial sewage and waste, while the remaining 75% originates from domestic sources.
[5] Flooding is the most prominent natural hazard in Argentina, and along with the littoral provinces, Buenos Aires is a very high risk area.
These floods are due to two causes: the condition of the drainage network, and strong winds from the southeast, (sudestadas), which produce a rise of the Rio de la Plata high above its average.
From the topographical standpoint, the City of Buenos Aires and its suburbs are located in a periphery of rolling grasslands, characterized by its limited slope toward the Rio de la Plata.
All of the watercourses have the special characteristics of a plain region: short water courses with little permanent flow, irregular routes, and broad flood valleys.
[12] Governance issues, institutional weaknesses and lack of control mechanisms are responsible for the failure of the Buenos Aires water concession.
[12] The Government of Argentina (GoA) with World Bank assistance has aimed to reduce industrial wastewater discharge (organic as well as toxic effluents) that directly enter the MR River.
The lawsuit resulted in a landmark decision from the Supreme Court in 2008, which ruled on the side of the residents and determined that the defendants were liable for restoration and future prevention of environmental damage in the river basin.
Throughout the entire process, FARN played a vital role in analyzing the defendants’ submissions, submitting briefs and "amparos" (claims of constitutional violations), and coordinated the efforts of the different organizations.
Since the ruling, in which the Supreme Court named FARN as a "permanent independent monitoring body for Riachuelo cleanup," the organization has maintained its leadership role.
ACUMAR has been legally provided with sufficient management and enforcement power in addressing the coordination issues of the MR river basin.