Aspects of judicial restraint include the principle of stare decisis (that new decisions should be consistent with previous decisions); a conservative approach to standing (locus standi) and a reluctance to grant certiorari;[1] and a tendency to deliver narrowly tailored verdicts, avoiding “unnecessary resolution of broad questions.”[1] Judicial restraint may lead a court to avoid hearing a case in the first place.
The court may justify its decision by questioning whether the plaintiff has standing; or by refusing to grant certiorari; or by determining that the central issue of the case is a political question better decided by the executive or legislative branches of government; or by determining that the court has no jurisdiction in the matter.
Vacco v. Quill is an example of judicial restraint,[4] in part for upholding a New York state law criminalizing physician-assisted suicide if the patient is terminally ill, and in part for refusing to set any new precedent such as a constitutionally protected right to die if terminally ill. Former Associate Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., considered to be one of the first major advocates of the philosophy of judicial restraint, described its importance in many of his books.
[5] One writer described Associate Justice Felix Frankfurter, a Democrat appointed by Franklin Roosevelt, as the "model of judicial restraint".
Articulated by Justice Louis D. Brandeis, these principles guide the Court in steering clear of constitutional rulings whenever possible.