The incident was provoked by an inspection or shut-down attempt of the Somali National Alliance (SNA) controlled Radio Mogadishu by UNOSOM troops.

[1][2] The SNA, under the leadership of General Mohammed Farah Aidid, denied initiating the attack and demanded an unbiased commission to ascertain the culprits.

Following the passing of UNSCR 837 on 6 June 1993, UNOSOM II and the SNA would engage in a devastating four month long conflict until the cessation of hostilities following the Battle of Mogadishu.

Major disagreements between the UN and the Somali National Alliance began soon after the establishment of UNOSOM II, centering on the perceived true nature of the operations political mandate.

[5] In early May 1993, Gen. Aidid and Col. Abdullahi Yusuf of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) agreed to convene a peace conference for central Somalia.

[7] As the conference began, Aidid sought assistance from UNOSOM ambassador Lansana Kouyate, who proposed air transport for delegates and a 14-day accommodation.

[10] The contention between the Somali National Alliance and UNOSOM from this point forward began to manifest in anti-UNOSOM propaganda broadcast from SNA controlled Radio Mogadishu.

[12] It had in recent weeks begun airing anti American and anti-UNOSOM propaganda condemning interference in Somali politics after UN envoy Admiral Johnathan Howe had rejected the May peace conference Aidid had set up.

[16] Mohammed Sahnoun, the representative of the UN Secretary-General in Somalia during UNOSOM I, reported that rumours of an attempted UN shut down of the station had reached him days before the incident.

[12] An agreement had been previously signed between the warring Somali factions and UNOSOM to store heavy weaponry in Authorized Weapons Storage Sites (AWSS), which was subject to UN inspections.

[13] On the afternoon of Friday June 4th, the day before the battle, UNOSOM notified General Aidid's headquarters that they were planning to inspect six of his arms storage sites.

[18][15] Awale protested that he was not authorized to accept such a notification, a claim which UNOSOM representatives rejected, and informed him that he was a recognized high official of the SNA.

[13][18] This perceived slight greatly played into Aidid's growing fear that UNOSOM was attempting marginalize his authority in their effort to recreate the Somali state.

[12] On the morning of Saturday June 5th 1993 an element of the Pakistani force in Somalia had been tasked with the inspection of site AWSS 5, which happened to be located at Aidid controlled Radio Mogadishu.

The station was popular across the city, even among those who did not like Aidid or the Habr Gidr clan and concern that UNOSOM was coming to shut it down infuriated many citizens of Mogadishu.

[13][4] Maj Tariq Mahmood, a soldier who was part of the operation noted that, "Entry into the area was smooth but soon thereafter a crowd began gathering outside the building.

[4] According to Somali accounts, the UNOSOM troops also began damaging the FM Radio and removing the stations staff from the compound.

[4][18] According to Pakistani accounts a Somali man had attempted to snatch a rifle from a soldier and was killed by the troops in the ensuing melee.

According to General Ikram that attackers were on both sides of the road, battling for two and a half hours with the Pakistanis, using heavy machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades and rocket launchers.

Somali accounts claim that the Pakistanis at Radio Mogadishu had opened fire on the crowd first, leading to a response that initiated the battle.

Aidid asserted that the United Nations had a conflict of interest when judging an assault on its own forces and, therefore, demanded an unbiased commission to ascertain responsibility for the incident.

[3][18] In Pakistan, Qazi Hussain Ahmed, head of the party Jamiat Islami called for the total withdrawal of Pakistani troops following the attack, saying they were only serving the interests of US imperialism in Somalia.

[26][27][28][29][30][31] On the following day 14 June, Doctors Without Borders responded to the killings with press release denouncing the excessive use of force by UNOSOM II troops.

[19] The following day on 6 June 1993, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 837, calling for the arrest and prosecution of the persons responsible for the death and wounding of the peacekeepers.

[34][35] Adm. Jonathan Howe, the United Nations envoy to Somalia heading UNOSOM II, announced on UN radio that a full investigation would be made into the affair, and appropriate steps taken against those responsible.

[38] UNOSOM began to greatly increase its firepower in Mogadishu and started making deliberate shows of force with Italian and American helicopters over the city.

Despite Clintons rejection, Delta began training for the operation early in the summer and commanders dispatched an assessment team to Somalia in June.