Facing an overwhelming force, the Indian Army evacuated the Dhola Post as well as the entire area of Tawang, retreating to Sela and Bomdila.

[4] After the war, the post was left unoccupied until the 1986 Sumdorong Chu standoff, after which the area was again strengthened by the Indian Army.

The Dhola Post was set up by the Indian border forces on the lower slopes of Tsangdhar range on its northern side.

[11] The Dhola Post was located on the northern slopes of the Tsangdhar ridge, close to the Namkha Chu valley, at about 300 metres above the level of the river.

[18] The terrain was extremely difficult: thickly wooded mountain slopes led to the area via walking tracks in narrow gorges.

[18] A walking track was established along the mountain slope facing the Namjyang Chu valley, leading from Lumpo to a depression called Hatung La on the Tangdhar ridge.

[19] The army officer who commanded the Assam Rifles platoon, Captain Mahabir Prasad, questioned the siting of the post immediately after returning to base.

[11] The Divisional Commander, Maj. Gen. Niranjan Prasad, queried the higher officers whether the territory was properly Indian, but did not receive a response.

His superior, Lt. Gen. Umrao Singh commanding the XXXIII Corps, expressed his own doubts about the legality of the territory, which were also greeted with no response.

[20] Eventually the matter was referred to Sarvepalli Gopal heading the Historical Division of the Ministry of External Affairs, who answered in the affirmative, citing the Officials' Report.

[21] When General Prasad, the divisional commander, did not receive a reply to his query about the boundary, he assessed that it made tactical sense to occupy the Thagla Ridge preemptively.

[22][23] Scholars find the inefficiencies of the Army command responsible for the Indian inaction, but at the same time the lack of clarity on where the border lay and indecision on how far to go in confronting the Chinese seem to have played a role.

[25] The Indian Army high command saw the Chinese action as an attempt to replicate in Assam Himalaya the kind of encroachments they were already conducting in Aksai Chin.

It was felt that a show of determination was called for to forestall any further encroachments; a 'no alternative' situation, in the words of scholar Steven Hoffmann.

[26] In a meeting chaired by defence minister Krishna Menon, it was decided that India would use force "to expel the Chinese from the south of the Thagla [Ridge]".

[27] The Army headquarters ordered 7th Infantry Brigade to move to Dhola to deal with the Chinese investment of the post.

Umrao Singh argued that the Chinese could easily outstrip any effort by India to induct new troops into the area since they had a roadhead leading to their positions.

[36] Following the clash at Tseng Jong it was clear to General Kaul that the Chinese meant to confront Indian actions.

In that year, the Chinese forces entered the south of the Sumdorong Chu valley and set up semi-permanent structures at the pasturage of Wangdung.

Taking up locations on multiple heights, Indian troops were able to strategically occupy the high ground near Sumdorong Chu.