Amphibious warfare ship
These rowing boats were sufficient, if inefficient, in an era when marines were effectively light infantry, participating mostly in small-scale campaigns in far-flung colonies against less well-equipped indigenous opponents.
[1]: 40 During World War I, the mass mobilization of troops equipped with rapid-fire weapons quickly rendered such boats obsolete.
Initial landings during the Gallipoli campaign took place in unmodified rowing boats that were extremely vulnerable to attack from the Ottoman shore defences.
A design was created in four days resulting in an order for 200 'X' lighters with a spoon-shaped bow to take shelving beaches and a drop-down frontal ramp.
[2] During the inter-war period, the combination of the negative experience at Gallipoli and economic stringency contributed to the delay in procuring equipment and adopting a universal doctrine for amphibious operations in the Royal Navy.
To prevent fouling of the propellers in a craft destined to spend time in surf and possibly be beached, a crude waterjet propulsion system was devised by White's designers.
[7] In 1939, during the annual Fleet Landing Exercises, the FMF became interested in the military potential of Andrew Higgins's design of a powered, shallow-draught boat.
[8] Its specifications were to weigh less than ten long tons, to be able to carry the thirty-one men of a British Army platoon and five assault engineers or signallers, and to be so shallow drafted as to be able to land them, wet only up to their knees, in eighteen inches of water.
The result was a small steel ship that could land 200 troops, traveling from rear bases on its own bottom at a speed of up to 15 knots.
[6] Constructed of steel and selectively clad with armour plate, this shallow-draft, barge-like boat with a crew of 6, could ferry a tank of 16 long tons to shore at 7 knots (13 km/h).
Admiral Maund, director of the Inter-Service Training and Development Centre (which had developed the Landing Craft Assault[citation needed]), gave the job to naval architect Sir Roland Baker, who within three days completed initial drawings for a 152-foot (46 m) landing craft with a 29-foot (8.8 m) beam and a shallow draft.
Tank tests with models soon determined the characteristics of the craft, indicating that it would make 10 knots (19 km/h; 12 mph) on engines delivering about 700 hp (520 kW).
The Mark 4 was slightly shorter and lighter than the Mk.3, but had a much wider beam (38 ft 9 in (11.81 m)) and was intended for cross channel operations as opposed to seagoing use.
When tested in early assault operations, like the ill-fated Allied raid on Dieppe in 1942, the lack of manoeuvring ability led to the preference for a shorter overall length in future variants, most of which were built in the United States.
When the United States entered the war in December 1941, the U.S. Navy had no amphibious vessels at all, and found itself obliged to consider British designs already in existence.
The Bureau of Ships quickly set about drawing up plans for landing craft based on Barnaby's suggestions, although with only one ramp.
The British evacuation from Dunkirk in 1940 demonstrated to the Admiralty that the Allies needed relatively large, ocean-going ships capable of shore-to-shore delivery of tanks and other vehicles in amphibious assaults upon the continent of Europe.
To carry 13 Churchill infantry tanks, 27 vehicles and nearly 200 men (in addition to the crew) at a speed of 18 knots, it could not have the shallow draught that would have made for easy unloading.
[17] The LST(2) gave up the speed of HMS Boxer at only 10 knots but had a similar load while drawing only 3 feet forward when beaching.
Congress provided the authority for the construction of LSTs along with a host of other auxiliaries, destroyer escorts, and assorted landing craft.
The keel of the first LST was laid down on 10 June 1942 at Newport News, Va., and the first standardized LSTs were floated out of their building dock in October.
Lightly armored, they could steam cross the ocean with a full load on their own power, carrying infantry, tanks and supplies directly onto the beaches.
[19] The Landing Craft Control (LCC) were 56-foot (17 m) U.S. Navy vessels, carrying only the crew (Scouts and Raiders) and newly developed radar.
[23] A full reload was a very labor-intensive operation and at least one LCT(R) went alongside a cruiser and got a working party from the larger ship to assist in the process.
The Fairmile H Landing Craft Support (Large) had armour added to its wooden hull and a turret with an anti-tank gun fitted.
Two British light fleet carriers were pressed into service to carry helicopters, and a battalion-sized airborne assault was made.
Delays in the construction of the Iwo Jima class saw other conversions made as a stopgap measure; three Essex-class aircraft carriers (Boxer, Princeton, and Valley Forge) and one Casablanca-class escort carrier (Thetis Bay) were converted into Boxer- and Thetis Bay-class amphibious assault vessels.
Helicopter amphibious assault techniques were developed further by American forces in the Vietnam War and refined during training exercises.
These large hovercraft further expand the range of conditions under which an amphibious assault can take place and increase the speed of transfer of assets from ship to shore.
However, if the predictions of military experts such as John Keegan or others[26] hold true, and surface shipping becomes extremely dangerous during future wars of evenly matched powers (due to satellite reconnaissance and anti-ship missiles), then transport and amphibious assault submarines might deserve another look.
