Lia radiological accident
The Lia radiological accident began on December 2, 2001, with the discovery of two orphan radiation sources near the Enguri Dam in Tsalenjikha District in the country of Georgia.
The accident was a result of unlabeled radioisotope thermoelectric generator (RTG) cores which had been improperly dismantled and left behind from the Soviet era.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) led recovery operations and organized medical care.
The relays were in remote territory with no reliable access to electricity, and thus were powered with a series of eight radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs) manufactured in 1983.
The actual dose received per hour would be lower unless physically touching the source, as radiation decreases with distance according to the inverse-square law.
[1] Three men from Lia (later designated as patients 1-DN, 2-MG, and 3-MB by the IAEA) had driven 45–50 km (28–31 mi) to a forest overlooking the Enguri Dam reservoir to gather firewood.
Patient 3-MB used a stout wire to pick up one source and carried it to a rocky outcrop that would provide shelter.
Despite the small amount of alcohol, they all vomited soon after consuming it, the first sign of acute radiation syndrome (ARS), about three hours after first exposure.
On December 15, patients 1-DN and 2-MG developed burning and itching on the small of their backs, where the radiation source had been closest.
Despite intensive care, repeated antibiotics, multiple surgeries, and an attempted skin graft, the wound did not heal.
This is close to the doses determined by the measurements of chromosome aberrations taken from blood samples analyzed by the Georgia Cytogenetics Laboratory.
[1] The day after the hospitalization, Georgian authorities attempted to find the suspected radiation sources, but bad weather prevented them from reaching the site.
For this reason, the IAEA had intended to wait until the spring thaw to recover the sources, but concerns by residents led the Georgian government to push for an early recovery.
[1][4] The sources were successfully recovered, and carefully escorted by police back to a permanent storage location.
Inclement weather had prevented its removal, and it acted to reflect and scatter radiation back at the workers.
The IAEA also noted that better tool design, as well as the use of more workers at a time to provide spotting capabilities, would have made the process faster and safer.
[1] The IAEA's final report concluded that the proximate cause of the accident was that the sources were unmarked and unlabeled, and thus their danger could not be known.
The initial clinician who treated patient 2-MG did not accurately assess the injury (partly due to 2-MG's failure to mention the orphan source), thus delaying proper treatment for almost three weeks.
