MAC address anonymization

Building the index is an embarrassingly parallel problem, and so the work can be accelerated greatly e.g. by renting a large amount of cloud computing resources temporarily.

For example, if a single CPU can compute 1,000,000 encrypted MACs per second, then generating the full table takes 8.9 CPU-years.

Using a rainbow table with a "depth" of 1,000,000 hashes per entry, the resulting table would only contain a few hundred million entries (a few GB) and require 0.5 seconds (on average, ignoring I/O time) to reverse any encrypted MAC into its original form.

[10] In particular, Junade Ali and Vladimir Dyo developed an approach which works by:[11] The degree to which a resulting hash is truncated is a balancing act between the privacy offered and the desired collision rate (the probability that one anonymised MAC Address will overlap with another).

Previous work has suggested that it is therefore difficult to control the anonymity set size when using approximations of the Birthday Paradox.