[11] Alexander Rabinowitch summarises the main long-term and short-term causes: Despite its occurrence at the height of World War I, the roots of the February Revolution dated further back.

Chief among these was Imperial Russia's failure, throughout the 19th and early 20th century, to modernise its archaic social, economic, and political structures while maintaining the stability of ubiquitous devotion to an autocratic monarch.

In 1905, Russia experienced humiliating losses in its war with Japan, then during Bloody Sunday and the Revolution of 1905, Tsarist troops fired upon a peaceful, unarmed crowd.

[19] In an attempt to boost morale and repair his reputation as a leader, Tsar Nicholas announced in the summer of 1915 that he would take personal command of the army, in defiance of almost universal advice to the contrary.

[16] The Duma, which was composed of liberal deputies, warned Tsar Nicholas II of the impending danger and counselled him to form a new constitutional government, like the one he had dissolved after some short-term attempts in the aftermath of the 1905 Revolution.

[6] Historian Edward Acton argues that "by stubbornly refusing to reach any modus vivendi with the Progressive Bloc of the Duma... Nicholas undermined the loyalty of even those closest to the throne [and] opened an unbridgeable breach between himself and the public opinion.

"[26]The Duma President Mikhail Rodzianko, Grand Duchess Marie Pavlovna and British ambassador Buchanan joined calls for Alexandra to be removed from influence, but Nicholas still refused to take their advice.

[39] On 26 February O.S (11 March N.S) Mikhail Rodzianko, Chairman of the Duma, had sent the Tsar a report of the chaos in a telegram (exact wordings and translations differ, but each retains a similar sense[21]): The situation is serious.

The Duma found itself in an ambiguous situation: on the one hand, it had received an order from Nicholas II for its own dissolution and feared the approach of a supposed "punitive expedition" to Petrograd.

As a result, the Progressive Bloc and leftist deputies (Trudoviks and Social Democrats) decided to formally comply with the dissolution order but still convene under the guise of a "private meeting."

As Pavel Milyukov later wrote, The intervention of the State Duma gave the street and military movement a center, provided it with a banner and a slogan, and thus transformed the uprising into a revolution, which resulted in the overthrow of the old regime and the dynasty.To oversee the administration of government ministries, the Provisional Committee of the State Duma appointed its own commissars and established various commissions, including military and food supply commissions.

As a result, from the evening of February 27 until March 2, 1917, the Provisional Committee of the State Duma functioned as the de facto supreme authority in Russia, assuming the powers of the still formally existing monarch.

[48]Nicholas's response on 27 February O.S (12 March N.S), perhaps based on the Empress's earlier letter to him that the concern about Petrograd was an over-reaction, was one of irritation that "again, this fat Rodzianko has written me lots of nonsense, to which I shall not even deign to reply".

The weakness and inadequacy of technology on the Russian network must be compensated for by your selfless energy, love for the homeland and awareness of your role as transport for the war and improvement of the rear.Shortly thereafter, another order was issued, prohibiting trains from traveling within 265 kilometers of Petrograd.

In doing so, he rendered an enormous—though still unrecognized—service to the Russian Revolution, while simultaneously distorting its natural course by surrounding the Duma with an undeserved aura of legitimacy.Bublikov was also one of the four Duma members who guarded Nicholas II during his trip from Mogilev to Tsarskoe Selo for the rest of the revolution, as head of the Ministry of the Ways of Communication, he controlled the route and itinerary of the tsar's journey, effectively sealing Nicholas's ability to react from this point onward.

Around the same time, at 08:25, General Khabalov sent a telegram to the Stavka:"The number of those remaining loyal to their duty has decreased to 600 infantrymen and 500 cavalrymen, with 13 machine guns and 12 artillery pieces, each with only 80 shells in total.

He further described the chaos in the city:"Scattered soldiers and gangs roam the streets, shooting at passersby and disarming officers… All railway stations are under the control of the revolutionaries and are strictly guarded by them… All artillery depots are in the hands of the revolutionaries…"[57]On the night of February 28 to March 1, Chief of Staff of the Army Alekseyev sent a telegram to Adjutant General Ivanov, a copy of which was later also sent to the commanders-in-chief of the fronts to inform them of the situation in the capital.

According to the historian G. M. Katkov, “on the evening of February 28, Alekseyev ceased to be an obedient executor in relation to the tsar and took on the role of mediator between the monarch and his rebellious parliament.

According to historian G. M. Katkov,“By the evening of February 28, Alekseyev ceased to be merely a submissive executor of the tsar’s orders and instead assumed the role of mediator between the monarch and his rebellious parliament.

A proclamation to the population, issued by the Provisional Government, affirms the stability of the monarchical foundation of Russia and the necessity of establishing a new basis for selecting and appointing a government… In Petrograd, they eagerly await His Majesty’s arrival to present him with these matters and the people’s request to accept their wishes.”Alekseyev continued:“If this information is correct, then the approach to action must change.

Shortly thereafter, he received Nicholas II’s official order to halt all troop movements, marking the final collapse of any effort to suppress the revolution.

"[65]On 28 February O.S , at five in the morning, the Tsar had left Mogilev, (and also directed Nikolai Ivanov to go to Tsarskoye Selo) but was unable to reach Petrograd as revolutionaries controlled railway stations around the capital.

[citation needed] The Army Chief Nikolai Ruzsky, and the Duma deputies Vasily Shulgin and Alexander Guchkov who had come to advise the Tsar, suggested that he abdicate the throne.

The next day the Grand Duke realised that he would have little support as ruler, so he declined the crown,[50] stating that he would take it only if that was the consensus of democratic action by the Russian Constituent Assembly, which shall define the form of government for Russia.

[67] The manifesto proposed a plan of civic and political rights and the installation of a democratically elected Russian Constituent Assembly, but did not touch on many of the topics that were driving forces in the revolution such as participation in World War I and land.

The Soviet had stronger practical power because it controlled the workers and the soldiers, but it did not want to become involved in administration and bureaucracy; the Provisional Government lacked support from the population.

The soviets were made up of workers and soldiers directly, being a democratic institution, allowing for cooperative decision making, while the Provisional Government was formed from the Duma delegates.

The Provisional Government was granted formal authority, but the Soviet Executive Committee had the support of the people resulting in political unrest until the Bolshevik takeover in October.

[71] During the April Crisis (1917) Ivan Ilyin agreed with the Kadet Minister of Foreign Affairs Pavel Milyukov who staunchly opposed Petrograd Soviet demands for peace at any cost.

[76] Kerensky declared freedom of speech, ended capital punishment, released thousands of political prisoners, and tried to maintain Russian involvement in World War I.