The term "micromega" references Micromégas, a tale by Voltaire in which dwarfs and giants dialogue.
For electoral rules, it is postulated that a few large parties tend to prefer small assemblies, small district magnitudes (the smallest being one), and rules based on small quotas of votes for allocating seats (the smallest being simple plurality, which does not require any specific threshold), while multiple small parties tend to prefer large assemblies, large district magnitudes, and large quotas (like those of proportional representation: within proportional representation systems, given the same number of seats, systems with a higher quota such as Hare or Sainte-Laguë favour smaller parties, while systems with a lower quota such as Droop or D'Hondt favour larger parties).
More generally, electoral systems and other prominent political institutions can be seen as a consequence of already existing political party systems in assemblies and governments, each of which tends to prefer those institutional formulas and procedures that can consolidate, reinforce or increase their relative strength.
[3] Inspired by the micromega rule, Rein Taagepera presented the seat product model, which predicts the effective number of parties in the system as a function of the assembly size and average district magnitude.
[5] A relevant implication of Taagepera’s equation for political practitioners of institutional design is that if the size of the assembly is rather stable and depends on the country's size, for a small country with a small assembly just a few parties can be sufficient to produce a change of electoral system in favor of proportional representation, while, for a large country and a large assembly, many parties would be necessary to produce such a result.